The Transformation of China-India Relations and the Way Forward

After the June 2020 Galwan Valley incident, China-India relations suffered the most serious setbacks since the normalization of their relationship in 1988. The bilateral relationship has been stuck in a state of stagnation and hit an all-time low with frequent frictions since then. Indias negative impact on Chinas national sovereignty, security, core development interests, and strategic environment has become increasingly notable. In the context of the US corralling its allies and partners to implement a comprehensive strategy of suppression and containment against China, Indias harsh, risky and aggressive policies against China are undoubtedly encouraged by the US policy of deterring China. The Indian actions have led to increasing uncertainty on the future of China-India relations. Once India becomes an extension and springboard of anti-China forces of the US and the West, the structural nature of bilateral contradictions between China and India will become more prominent, with continuing low-level face-offs and frequent frictions in bilateral relations. Given that Indias domestic and foreign policies and the political and economic foundation of China-India relations have undergone qualitative changes at varying degrees in recent years, China must rediscover and understand the new India based on bottom-line thinking and from a long-term perspective, analyze the evolution and trend of China-India relations since Prime Minister Narendra Modi took office, especially after 2020, and identify the focus of managing China- India relations, to guide the trajectory of bilateral relations in a healthy and sustainable direction.

Adjustment and Transformation of India’s Diplomatic Strategy

After Modis Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government came to power in May 2014, Indias foreign policy underwent a significant adjustment, replacing the political romanticism from Nehru-era diplomacy with political realism. In 2013, Modi gave a speech that highlighted the core principles of the BJPs international and strategic thinking, declaring that “in dealing with other countries, one needs to strike a balance between peace (shanti) and power (shakti), concession and insistence, cooperation and assertion As Modi claimed, “The spirit of balance stemmed from the Indian culture. Indian leaders, after independence, had been insensitive at critical moments, weak when they should have been strong.’” The diplomatic team of the BJP government stressed that India should expand contact with partners, dare to draw red lines to strategic rivals, adhere to ‘pragmatism based on Indias interests^ more decisively, and strive to highlight the image of India as a ‘pole in a multipolar world. The BJP also calls for tuning down the non-aligned element of Indias foreign policy, shifting to multi-directional alliances, and closing flexible deals with major global powers. After the BJP held its National Executive Committee meeting in 2015, the Modi government declared that its foreign policy was guided by the 5S principles of ‘respect (samman), dialogue (samvad), prosperity (samriddhi), security (suraksha) and civilization (sabhyata)” to make India “a rising, powerful and respected world power. “

After Modis re-election as prime minister in 2019, Indias strategic self-positioning and understanding of the international environment underwent qualitative changes. Under the optimistic expectation of the inevitable rise of India, the worlds major countries and international organizations have competed to draw India to their side. In this context, Indies greatpower ambition ballooned, as reflected in its growing tendency to take bold diplomatic initiatives and assert itself.

The Modi government has abandoned the conservative foreign policy of keeping the status quo and shifted to an aggressive posture to promote Indias national interests in the global geostrategic environment. First, it broadens Indias international perspective beyond the traditional India-Pakistan conflict and the non-aligned movement to engage with all major global powers simultaneously; Second, it calls for sensitively anticipating changes in the world order and making better use of the new geopolitical situation to form alliances and consolidate Indias rightful position in the international community; Third, it expands the scope of national interests and incorporates into foreign policy more high-profile economic goals such as “Make in India” and promoting Indian participation in resilient supply chains.

Holding high the banner of Hindu nationalism and infusing nationalist spirit into diplomacy

Since independence, there have been two competing and opposite nationalist ideas in India. One idea started with the Indian peoples struggle for independence led by the Indian National Congress, which emphasizes building a diverse, secular and united India; the other, represented by the Hindutva (also known as Hindu supremacy or Hinduism) movement, pursues an exclusionary, Hindu-dominated India that “despises foreign cultures and ideas, but craves for recognition and kindness from foreigners.

The ideological clash between “‘diverse, secular, and united India⁵ and “India as a Hindu country” has long been intertwined with the competition between the Indian Congress Party and the BJR and thus profoundly shaped Indias internal and external policies. Over the past two decades, Hindu nationalist forces have gained the upper hand, gradually silencing the voices advocating a secular India Since the Modi government came to power, Indian party politics has “‘transformed from nationalist populism to electoral authoritarianism,” with “the executive departments controlling key institutions (including the Election Commission) and crony capitalists controlling the mainstream media.” Hindu nationalism is the ideological root of this political transformation. The Modi government has built shrines dedicated to Hindu nationalist leaders such as M. S. Golwalkar, K・ B. Hedgewar, and V. D. Savarkar, constantly rewriting the history of Indian civilization through the perspective of “Hindu identity;

Since his re-election, Modi has increasingly emphasized the “Hindu character” of Indian diplomacy. By defending the religious rights of Hindus abroad, the Indian government promotes Hindu internationalism and pushes the ideology of Hindu identity to the world. For example, during the visit of Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese to India in March 2023, Modi raised the issue of attacks on Hindu temples and Sikh separatism in Australia, which was the first time that India raised concerns about Hinduism with the Prime Minister of Australia. During Modis visit to Australia in May 2023, he again showed concerns about the destruction of Indian community centers and temples in Australia and the phenomenon of ^<<anti-India^, and “anti-Modi” graffiti.⁸ At roughly the same time, Indias new parliament building, supported by Modi, unveiled a map of Akhand Bharat (Undivided India) covering parts of present-day Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar. This drew strong protests from  the governments of Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Notably, the “Saffron-izatiorT of Indian society has brought about a transformation in Indias diplomatic circle: the once-dominant class of English-speaking diplomats has been gradually replaced by a new batch of Indian diplomatic elite indulged in Hinduism, the Hindi language, and a narrow sense of nationalistic pride.¹⁰ Indian diplomats worldwide have been exporting the image of Modi as the guardian of Indias national interests and asserting that Modi promotes Indias national pride and soft power to support the BJP in central and local elections.¹¹ In other words, the wave of Hindu nationalism has gradually permeated Indias foreign policy, shaped Indias domestic politics, and strengthened the BJPs power.

Meanwhile, to fix the negative image of xenophobic radicalism, hostility to Muslims at home and abroad, and trouble in relations with neighboring countries brought by the solid Hindu nationalist foreign policy; the Modi government has taken advantage of opportunities like the G20 summit to promote the concept of “The World Is One Family” (X^sudhaia Kutumbakam) and “May All Be Happy” (Sarve Bhavantu Sukhinah) in the international arena, declaring that all humans and all living things belong to one family; and encouraging people to transcend narrow identities and prejudices. The promoted concepts foster tolerance, friendship, and cooperation to jointly address global challenges such as climate change, poverty; and war. In his book The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain Worlds Indians External Affairs

Minister S. Jaishankar seeks to reconcile right-wing tendencies with left-wing expectations by defining Prime Minister Modis political vision, economic agenda and Indias security and geopolitical challenges, and thereby promote a public opinion campaign to portray India as a responsible emerging power.

Respecting Kautilya’s philosophy and advocating “India First” and realist politics

The realist ideas of the ancient Mauryan Empire philosopher Kautilya have profoundly influenced the worldview of decision-makers at the core of the BJP government. In his Arthashastra (The Science of Material Gain), Kautilya declared that all countries are on guard against each other and constantly preparing for war. With power and achievement as the highest goals, strong countries should prioritize increasing their power through war. In the Mandala (concentric circle) world system, just as the big fish eat the small fish, the strong win over the weak, and the potential conquerors are always eager to expand territories. Relations between countries can be hostile, friendly, intermediate, or neutral, which is determined by geographical location, balance of power, and strategic intentions. Neighbors are natural enemies, while neighbors of neighbors are potential allies. In foreign policy, a country can choose to maintain peace or fight with others, wait for a good timing, get prepared for war, form alliances, or anything in between, such as maintaining peace with one side and fighting with another.

According to Jaishankar, the global strategic environment has undergone significant changes in recent years. In a multipolar world characterized by a delicate balance of power and conflicting values and where countries may be both friend and foe, India must emphasize “India First” and abandon the early political romanticism, instead engaging in international affairs with ‘more activist, adventurous, creative realismIndia, now one of the worlds leading economies, is more capable of assuming greater responsibility. It should revisit its non-aligned tradition and move towards Kautilya politics, showing determination and responsibility and emphasizing the importance of alliances (sama), compensation (dana), force (danda), and deception (bheda) as ways to address political challenges. In a more nakedly self-interested world, where countries act according to their own needs, India cannot afford to let others exercise veto power over its policy choices, and there is no evidence that Indias global image of modesty will be reciprocated by political entities that are essentially hungry for power. Realism will prevail, and even allies will always strive for better dealing conditions for themselves. Under the influence of Kautilyas realism, the Modi government pursues the diplomacy of power first and balance of power among great powers, emphasizing that India should make good use of the global strategic environment, clearly understand and effectively advocate its interests, and deal with different countries with different strategies. “Make friends with the US, manage China, cultivate Europe, appease Russia, bring in Japan, attract neighbors, expand the peripheral, and broaden the traditional community that supports India, while actively assuming global responsibilities and showcasing Indias unique national identity.

Creating greater maneuvering space for a rising India and building a collective security network

In Jaishankars opinion, the friction and confrontation between China and the US will lead the world into uncharted territory, resulting in two parallel sets of world order that will test the ability of other countries to adjust to the new paradigm. Due to the interdependence, mutual permeation, and technological diffusion in the era of globalization, China and the US will not move towards a bipolar world but are more likely to go into a world of duality in technology, commerce, finance and connectivity; The US may have weakened, but Chinas rise is far from mature, and the two processes will provide more room for middle powers such as India. The interaction between China and the US may accelerate the process of world multipolarity, and the world will present a more complex architecture characterized by differing degrees of competition, integration and coordination. A multipolar world driven by a balance of power is not risk-free, and unfettered competition can spiral out of control at regional and global levels. Even if it does not always work, a collective security arrangement can serve as a safety valve. A negotiated broad consensus can be a backup plan for dealing with China-US strategic competition. Indias Minister of Defence Rajnath Singh also said the country rejects “a world order in which a few countries are superior to others. He advocated strengthening the collective security model and claimed that India firmly believes in a multi-alignment policy that, by joint participation of different stakeholders, discusses and addresses all stakeholders’ views and concerns to achieve common prosperity ultimately.

Seeking standard configuration and image of a leading world power based on multi-dimensional strategic positioning

First, India calls itself a leading power. The Modi government has repeatedly emphasized the pursuit of global leadership amid the reshaping of international order. In particular, hosting the G20 summit gives India “an opportunity to become a world leader at the time of global dramatic changes, and thus become a key player in global governance and order/^>19 Jaishankar spoke repeatedly about Modis vision to make India a major global power in the next 25 years.⁰ Second, India describes itself as a leader of the Global South. The Modi government argues that India can play a role in the vast Global South arena, charting a third way that is different from China and the US. The G20 presidency can “provide a window for India to assume the responsibility of peacemaker on behalf of the Global South and exclude China from it.^，>21 Third, India declares itself as the coordinator between the Global South and the Global West. Jaishankar cast India as a “Southwest power” with the characteristics of both Western countries and Global South countries, claiming that India can reconcile the contradictions between the two groups.² Jaishankar also claimed that based on its innate pluralism, India has a tradition of reconciliation between nationalism and global engagement, Indian nationalism is not driven by a “victim mentality/’ and India has the potential to be a “bridge between the established order and the emerging order.^>23 Fourth, India regards itself as the hegemon of the South Asian subcontinent and the untainted security provider in the Indian Ocean. For a long time, India has blatantly pursued the Monroe Doctrine, taking South Asia and the Indian Ocean region as its exclusive domain, India claims to be the master of the Indian Ocean and the greatest common denominator of multiple versions of the Indo-Pacific strategy, declaring that the entry of external forces requires Indias consent and they must respect Indias special security concerns in the Indian Ocean.

The Evolution and Trends of China-India Relations

The Galwan Valley incident is the inevitable consequence of Indias diplomatic strategy and policy adjustment towards China in recent years. It also serves as the climax of the downward spiral of China-India relations. Since the incident, India has further adjusted its strategy towards China, adopting retaliatory, confrontational and decoupling policies against China in a whole-of-government approach ranging from politics and economy to the military and diplomacy. This has intensified the dangerous trend of diminishing cooperation, intensifying competition, and continuous drift and distortion in China-India relations.

Positioning China as the biggest external threat to India’s rise

Indias great-power dream has been shrouded in a strong “China complex” for a long time. The country always uses China as the bottom line of reference in pursuing great-power status. It considers China the key competitor in the great-power quest and a reference target to beat. It also looks at China as the key external factor affecting its rise.⁴ The BJP government is deeply influenced by its parent organization, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) s anti-Pakistan and anti-China ideology. Since 2020, the Indian ruling and opposition political forces have simultaneously downplayed Pakistans threat to India, instead turning to incite the antiChina sentiment in public opinion and frequently playing up China-related issues.

First, China is denounced as the number one threat to Indias national security. Since 2020, India has publicly declared that China is the biggest threat to its strategic autonomy and accelerated the deployment of military and strategic resources to the China-India border. Second, India claims China as the biggest external obstacle to Indias rise. The Modi government asserted that Indias security situation has gradually deteriorated over the past three decades and the country has fallen behind China in terms of power. In the long term, Indias foreign policy must focus on ‘ensuring that India is not affected by the power projection of Chinas formidable rise.” Third, India judges China as a competitor for Indias global influence. To highlight Indias role as a leading force in reshaping the international order, the Modi government has championed itself as a firm believer in rules-based, transparent and reform-oriented multilateralism. It does not share the same zeal in smaller multilateral mechanisms in which China plays an important role, and is unwilling to let China play any important role in the spotlight of any multilateral mechanism. In the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, East Asia Summit, G20 summit and other platforms, India supports the position of the US and the West, shows significant interest in their multilateral mechanism proposals, and strives to prevent the multilateral mechanisms from facilitating Chinas rise as a great power.  Fourth, India regards itself as the ideal choice for the US and the West to relocate production in their de-risking supply chain strategy. The Modi government plans to subsidize the domestic manufacturing industry through the Production-Linked Incentive Scheme (PLI), seeking to profit from the Wests growing suspicion of China and eventually replacing China in the global production and supply chain. The head of Gateway House, an Indian economic think tank, declared, “A partnership between India and the US is critical to diversifying the global manufacturing supply chain, so dependent on China.” “The US, Japan and Australia have strong economies and technological prowess, and India can be a good test market for new global policy instruments, and new sustainable manufacturing and service methods” and a platform to “counter Chinas growing adventurism in the region.

A highly opportunistic and risky China policy calling for decoupling

With global geopolitical tensions and the rise of Hindu nationalism compounding, the Modi governments diplomatic and security team believes that a riskier policy towards China would bring greater benefits, and this has led to increasing opportunism in Indias China policy; Since the BJP came to power in 2014, India has challenged Chinas interests and concerns on issues related to the bilateral border, Xizang, Taiwan, the South China Sea and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, The Donglang standoff 2017 marked an escalation in the Modi governments strategy against China. It is worth noting that in August 2017, Ajai Shukla, a retired Indian colonel and military analyst, predicted rather prophetically that “the Chinese and Indian border troops were armed with guns but did not fire during the Donglang standoff but such restraint cannot be expected to be maintained. Sooner or later, some soldiers will be shot or injured due to physical collision, resulting in an escalation. Since June 2020, India has launched military confrontations with China in border areas such as the Galwan W[ley and the northern and southern banks of Pangong Lake, resulting in serious and bloody clashes between border troops of the two sides. In fact, the Galwan Valley incident played out exactly as what Colonel Shukla had predicted. It was an inevitable consequence of Indias attempt to replicate similar confrontations after tasting sweetness in the Donglang stand of Ex-post analysis of the Galwan Valley incident showed that it was a risky move by the Indian government based on its analysis of new domestic, regional and international developments. The root cause is that India has never given up its aggressive forward policy in the disputed territory with China. In May 2019, the BJP won a lopsided victory in the Lok Sabha (House of the People) election. Since then, the Indian governments foreign policy orientation of winning by taking risks has become noticeable. In August 2019, during the riots in Hong Kong, China, the Indian government took the risk of splitting the Jammu and Kashmir state into the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and the Union Territory of Ladakh, and putting them under the central governments direct rule. The former triggered a sharp stand-off between India and Pakistan, while the latter intensified the territorial dispute between India and China. At the same time, the territorial dispute erupted between India and Nepal, bringing relations between the two countries to a new low.

In summarizing the experience and lessons of more than seven decades of post-independence diplomacy, Jaishankar said in November 2019 that Indias foreign policy discourse has a traditional weakness that puts format and process more important than results, and what the Modi government has done is diplomatic innovation that challenges traditional practices and static narratives. In his opinion, risk-taking is inherent in diplomacy and a low-risk foreign policy can only bring limited returns. Indias diplomacy should not be bounded by dogma and must act as it sees fit in a fast-changing global order. To reap high returns, the policy should be adventurous and dares to take risks instead of being too cautious. In April to May 2020, amid the raging COVID-19 pandemic, the 3rd Infantry Division of the Indian Army in Indian-controlled Kashmir violated the agreement between China and India by building a makeshift bridge over the Shyok River and attempting to cross into Chinese territory in the Galwan Wiley along the western section of the China-India border. The Indian troops built fortifications and obstacles, seeking to change the status quo of border control unilaterally. The resulting clash resulted in heavy casualties on both sides. After the Galwan Valley incident, India stepped up its efforts to control the disputed border areas. In a special briefing on the Modi governments diplomatic achievments in 2023, the Ministry of External Affairs revealed that the average border infrastructure budget of India until 2014 was less than 4,000 crores before Modi came to power in 2014, now the budget soared to 14,000 crores. In constructing border roads, tunnels, bridges, or Indian military equipment, “it’s gone up twice, thrice, four times.

Under the influence of the Galwan \^lley incident and the COVID-19 pandemic, the Indian government has introduced a series of discriminatory policies against China in economics, trade and investment. Politicians and the media have advocated decoupling and disrupting the industrial and supply chains with China. On the one hand, the Modi government has encouraged Western multinational companies to transfer production capacity from China to India. On the other hand, it has tried to generalize the security factors in China-India trade and economic cooperation, proposing some “de-Sinification^, initiatives and economic strategies such as “Make in India,” “self-reliance campaigrT and “industrial substitution.”

First, it suppresses the access of Chinese digital products. In the name of safeguarding national security, the Indian government has blocked hundreds of Chinese apps, deliberately delayed the approval process of mobile phone parts for Chinese brands such as Xiaomi and OPPO, and confiscated huge assets of Chinese companies like Xiaomi. Second, it has imposed restrictions on Chinese investment and equipment. The Indian government has introduced foreign investment policies that discriminate against Chinese investment, imposed basic tariffs on Chinese solar cell equipment, and asked Indian state-owned telecommunications companies to stop using Chinese equipment and prohibit the import of power generation, transmission and distribution equipment from China through so-called ”internal guidance.” Third, India has launched a boycott of Chinas goods and services, often citing the so-called rules of origin. Fourth, it has deliberately blocked people-to-people exchanges between the two countries, waging a public opinion offensive against China. Indias Ministry of External Affairs has long restricted journalists from China unreasonably, and its education department has repeatedly launched a review of bilateral cooperation projects such as the Confucius Institute. According to a report by EU DisinfbLab, the New Delhi-headquartered Srivastava Group, with overseas bases in Geneva and Brussels, remotely controls 750 fake media outlets, think tanks and NGOs in 116 countries and regions around the world, using the Asian News International (ANI) to spread disinformation against China and Pakistan.¹ Fifth, India has manipulated misinformation on Xizang, Taiwan and other core interests of China to drive a wedge between China and its close neighbors like Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka. It repeatedly discredits Chinas cooperation initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative. These actions by India intend to force China to make concessions on the border issue and restore bilateral relations in the post-Galwan era to the status quo as defined by India, but the attempt will certainly hurt Indias own interests and negatively affect the long-term development of China-India relations.

Reinforcing strategic connections with the US to jointly restrain and contain China

The most visible change in Indias foreign policy adjustment in recent years is reflected in India-US relations» According to Indian scholar Swaran Singh, ^aWhile China has demonstrated an unprecedented economic growth that underpins its political influence and military modernization, Chinas rise has made India the preferred partner for status quo powers in the US-led liberal world order.” “This has opened doors for technology transfers and defense cooperation for India, making India the only neighbor that has showcased capacity to stand up to China.^,32

In the context of the United States’ all-around efforts to suppress and contain China, India believes it is in a period of strategic opportunity; It has adopted a policy of deep engagement with the US while managing China as the core of its major-power strategy; and actively catered to the US strategic demands to contain China. According to Jaishankar, Indias relationship with the US is the core of Indias overall relations with the West, India has never used the anti-Western sentiment as a domestic rallying point in its history; and it has much in common with the West in liberal democracy; governance practices, marketization, rule of law and their interests. India and the West should integrate into each others global blueprint, and the West should look at the growing power of India as a strategic opportunity serving the Wests greater interests. Indies former National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon also believes India is trying to create a favorable environment for its transformation, which is impossible to complete without a good relationship with the US. Daniel S. Markey; Senior Advisor on South Asia for the US Institute of Peace (USIP), said ^Washington sees India as “a strategic swing state in a world order increasingly defined by competition between the US and China,” adding that human rights concerns have “generally taken a back seat” to geopolitics.

India has advanced its ties with the US in defense and has become a de-facto ally of the US to some extent Despite historical suspicion of the US, the Indian military and political establishment has weighed the pros and cons of a closer relationship with the US, and gradually moved to a position of containing China as the countrys strategic priority and shifting to a proUS position in the security, defense and strategic fields. In 2002, India and the US signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), which started in-depth military cooperation between the two countries. In 2016, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Agreement on Logistics Exchange (LEMOA) to carry out substantive cooperation in base sharing, weapons and equipment production, and joint military exercises. In 2018, they signed the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), which provides a legal framework for exporting comm unications, security and data equipment from the US to India and significantly improves real-time data sharing between the two countries on command, control, communications, computer intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR). In October 2020, India-US military relations reached another milestone when the two countries signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation (BECA), which allows the exchange of highly classified geospatial intelligence and opens the door to full military cooperation between India and the US. Tb promote a wider range of military interoperability India has also participated in the operation of the US-Japan-India-Australia+ series of military exercises, including the military exercise Sea Dragon with Canada and the La Perouse joint military exercise with France. By working closely with countries such as the US, Japan, Australia and France on issues of common interest, India has overcome the limitations of its economic and military power and gained a greater strategic advantage. In addition, it is worth noting that in June 2023, India and the US announced a roadmap for bilateral defense industrial cooperation, illustrating the American goal of ‘”developing India into something that looks like a formidable ally” and the Indian goal to beef up its own capabilities.⁵ The US Embassy in India said in a statement that the roadmap is intended to change the paradigm of cooperation between Indian and US defense sectors and will accelerate technical cooperation and joint production in areas such as air combat and support, land mobility; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and munitions.

India and the US are coordinating to advance the initiative of de-Sinification at economic and technical levels. The US and the West have focused on supporting India as an alternative to China in infrastructure and traditional industries, advocating the Indo-US Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) and the Japan-Australia-India Resilient Supply Chain Initiative (RSCI), etc. The aim is to suppress China and direct production to India while weakening the advantages of “Made in China⁵‘ and Chinæs position in global production and supply chains. India actively supports and promotes the US-Western de-Sinicization initiative, aiming to take advantage of the help extended by the US and other Western countries to challenge the existing regional industrial and supply chain in which China is the core and eventually set up a new one to replace Chinas central position in regional and global production. Ashok Kantha, former Indian Ambassador to China, said that although India believes that “a nation like China cant be contained, nor are we interested to the economic decoupling from China,” it is “more inclined towards some kind of de-risking strategy vis-à-vis China； and “working together with USA and other likeminded countries will become, and is already in fact, an important component of our policy”

In the future, the US will continue to suppress and contain China in all aspects, and India will further cooperate with relevant US actions. The two countries will continue strengthening their strategic connections on China-related issues. This trend will encourage India to take risks on China issues, add to obstacles in negotiations, increase the difficulty of managing differences between China and India, and make permanent the long-term confrontation in bilateral relations. Some Indian policy elites even suggested that a moderate level of tension between China and India can serve as a lubricant to deepen strategic cooperation between India and the US-led alliance system and serve the strategic interests of India.⁸ With the gradual permeation of the US into Indias strategic culture and foreign policy-making, Indies strategic autonomy will inevitably be eroded- In the long run, India might slowly look more like Japan or the United Kingdom, which actively align themselves with the US. The negative impact on Asia-Pacific strategic stability cannot be ignored.

Diminishing China-India cooperation among developing countries and in global governance

In the past, China and India have worked in areas such as the Non-Aligned Movement, climate change, sustainable development, South-South cooperation, emerging economies cooperation and the reform of the global governance system. Cooperation in the multilateral arena was once a bright spot and growth point of China-India relations. However, in recent years, India has deliberately highlighted its differences with China in regional and global governance, sustainable development and other aspects, aiming to squeeze China out of the Global South community, and engaged in fierce confrontation with China on issues such as the reform of the UN Security Council and the expansion of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In recent years, the signs of differences between the two countries have become notable at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS summits, sometimes causing the two major cooperation mechanisms to be ineffective. The root  cause is the widening development gap between China and India that led to growing differences in the two countries identity. In turn, it has led to increasingly obvious differences in the interests of the two countries, which has eroded the foundation of their multilateral cooperation, especially in regional and global governance. As the competition between China and India heats up and India accelerates its pivot to the US and the West, the moderating effect of jointly promoting multilateral mechanisms and global governance on China-India relations will gradually decline.

China and India Should Explore Ways to Get Along in New Era

The Indian strategic orientation of hedging, confronting and equalizing with China has become a new normal. This has increasingly become an annoyance in Chinai neighborhood diplomacy; India is not only one of the few emerging powers comparable to China in size and many aspects but also a neighboring country with territorial disputes and structural geostrategic problems with China. India has occasionally maintained cooperation with China on bilateral and multilateral occasions, but its strategic orientation regards China as the number one security threat and strategic competitor. India wants to tap the US and the West to guard against Chinàs expanding influence, but it is also unwilling to relinquish the traditional diplomatic benefits of straddling between the East and the West. In the future, China will go through a process of “rediscovering” India, discarding the stereotypes about India, realistically assessing Indies ability to maintain strategic independence, and making corresponding adjustments to its long-standing strategic thinking and policies toward India.

Although it is difficult to fundamentally change the complex nature and the contradictory coexistence of competition and cooperation in China-India relations in the short term, the bilateral relationship has inevitably entered a new historical period. Both the content and the extension of the relationship have undergone qualitative changes, and the original conditions supporting the earlier development of China-India relations and the momentum for advancing bilateral cooperation have significantly weakened. The bilateral relations are more susceptible to interference or subversive damage by third parties, and the volatility and vulnerability of the relationship becomes more notable. As the two countries overseas interests continue to expand and inevitably overlap, there will be more frictions and more competition between them in energy and resources, markets, systems and development models.

Nevertheless, China and India are major non-Western countries that cherish strategic independence. The two countries both regard the first half of the 21st century as a period of strategic opportunity to realize their national rejuvenation and “centennial dreams.” Both sides need stable bilateral relations and normal economic, trade and investment cooperation as well as diplomatic interaction. The two countries have common interests in maintaining a generally stable and predictable international order, building a multipolar world, and ensuring global strategic stability; With this outlook, they must explore new modes of interaction in the new era, maintain and pursue common or shared interests in the context of rising competition, and balance the strategic ambiguity between friendly cooperation and hostile confrontation.

Renewing early aspirations and carrying on the five principles of peaceful coexistence

In April 1954, the Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each others internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence were written into the preface to the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse Between the Xizang Region of China and India as the guideline for bilateral relations. The Five Principles were initially applied to Chinas relations with its neighboring independent states and later developed into universal principles for exchanges between countries with different governing systems. They have become the norms for properly handling international relations and settling  international disputes, gaining lasting vitality and wide influence worldwide. As the complexity and challenges of China-India relations increase, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence jointly advocated by the two countries have become more relevant in guiding the bilateral relations.

On the issue of China-India border dispute, during his visit to China in 1988, then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi put forward the idea of “‘parallel operation,” advocating cooperation in other areas while patiently solving the border issue. To this end, Gandhi proposed the establishment of relevant working groups. Finally, the two sides agreed to establish joint working groups on the border issue as well as on economy; trade, science and technology; Although the joint communique issued at the end of Gandhis visit did not use the wording of “mutual understanding and accommodation” proposed by China, “when Rajiv Gandhi met with the representative from China, he agreed to take this as one of the principles for the settlement of the border dispute, but hoped that it would not be included in the communique so that he could work on lawmakers and parties after returning home to form a broad consensus.⁵⁴² Rajiv Gandhis visit to China marked the improvement of China-India relations and served as a new starting point in bilateral relations. Reviewing the historical facts of this visit will help the two countries put the border dispute in the proper context of overall bilateral relations.

Moving forward together towards strategic stability through peaceful competition

In his book On China, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger argues that China and the US should pursue an approach of ^aco-evolution,^., “pursuing their respective domestic imperatives, cooperating where possible, and adjusting the bilateral relationship to minimize conflict.%’ In 2012, Kissinger clarified that the most appropriate label for China-US relations is not so much partnership as co-evolution. The two sides will implement their own policies based on their respective internal logic, and the two countries¹ policies coexist. Co-evolution is not based on a legal consensus but on the fact that the two countries have implemented a coexistence policy; The relationship between the two countries should shift from managing crisis to defining common goals and from resolving strategic contradictions to avoiding them.⁴⁴ Susan Thornton, former US Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, also believes that national power in the 21st century mainly comes from ‘economic vitality, social solidarity, the societys adjusting capability and the flexibility of governance, rather than only from geographical superiority or military power.” The road map for China-US relations should follow co-evolution to avoid the Thucydides Trap.

Although the nature and state of China-India relations differ from that of China-US relations, the co-evolution idea also inspires handling China-India relations in the new era. As the worlds only two emerging market economies with a population of more than one billion, China and India will be two rising stars that maintain strategic coexistence for a long time to come. It is difficult for external forces to block the rise or rejuvenation of the two countries. The two sides can only engage in peaceful competition, constantly refresh their understanding of each other and adjust themselves, realistically accept each others development and growth, and maintain the stability and predictability of bilateral relations in the process of co-evolution.

Cooperating to enhance economic, trade and investment ties

Since the Galwan Valley incident, although the Modi government has regarded China as a serious security threat, it is far from easy for India to openly acknowledge the alleged China challenge on the border due to economic interests. Taking Indies 2021-2022 fiscal year as an example, Chinas exports to India accounted for 15.4% of total Indian imports but only 2.8% of total Chinese exports. New Delhi would face greater economic losses than Beijing if it imposed unilateral economic sanctions on China.⁴⁶ Indies economic growth has benefited partially from Chinas high-quality and cheap products and services. In fact, there is a growing mismatch between strategic and business interests and a clear lack of consensus within the Indian government when dealing with border issues. Compared with the Ministry of Defense or Ministry of External Afi&irs, the ministries in charge of commerce, railways, science and technology are generally reluctant to damage relations with China because of their economic interests.⁴⁷ According to a report by the Indian Institute of External Trade (IIFT), since 2020, imports from China have increased in all Indian industries except the steel industry. The Chinese intermediate product imports have significantly boosted exports of key Indian industries such as inorganic chemicals and pharmaceuticals.⁴⁸ Although the Indian government wants to engage in the so-called decoupling and de-risking actions, pragmatic cooperation in the field of economy; trade, and investment will remain the ballast of China-India relations and the key link that ties the interests of the two countries.

Keeping communication channels open and maintaining strategic dialogue to avoid misjudgment and accidental conflicts

In recent years, some Indian politicians have reiterated that if the border dispute is not resolved, China-India relations will not return to normal. The attempt to hijack China-India relations to the border issue has deliberately disrupted basic exchanges between the two countries. Such an approach is unhelpful in achieving Indias objectives, puts the Indian government on thin ice, and easily triggers dangerous strategic miscalculations on the Indian side. The key to current China-India relations is not about whether they  can return to the earlier normal state, but whether both sides can smoothly communicate and manage differences. The more intense the bilateral relations, the more important it is for the two governments and peoples to strengthen communication and prevent the relationship from drifting out of control. The development of China-India relations after the Cold has shown that high-level strategic communication is a powerful tool to stabilize the bilateral relationship. It is necessary to maintain basic exchanges between officials at all levels of the two countries, and the two sides’ militaries need to maintain high-quality regular dialogue.

Revitalizing dialogue between civilizations and fostering social networks in a future-oriented manner

The unique historical background and a lack of mutual understanding have made China-India relations highly susceptible to media influence and public opinion. Emotional volatility is one of the major long-term challenges facing bilateral relations amid the rapid expansion of new media formats and the explosive growth of interactive information. There are more diverse stakeholders and actors participating in and shaping China-India relations. Mutual understanding between China and India and peoples feelings within the two countries will likely remain volatile. To fundamentally bring China-India relations back to the track of sound and sustainable development and build a model of bilateral interaction in the new era, we cannot succeed without a relatively objective and balanced public opinion environment and the mindset of accurately evaluating each others words and actions. The cultural and people-to-people exchanges between China and India have a history of more than 2,000 years and have left a rich material and spiritual legacy. The exchanges have not been interrupted even when relations between the two countries have suffered serious setbacks. The two sides should have the courage to jointly demonstrate the charm of oriental civilizations and cultures, build an equal and mutually beneficial social network between the two countries, and rebuild a sound and reliable strategic relationship of mutual benefit based on extensive cultural exchanges.