Since August 2022, Indias Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has emphasized on several occasions that India and China should work together to realize the Asian Century, Jaishankars speech before the UN General Assembly the following month stated that Indias foreign policy focuses on restoring normal diplomatic relations with China. However, looking at the Modi governments China policy since the June 2020 conflict in the Galvan it is evident that broadening and generalizing Indias security dilemma with China has become a prominent feature of Indias China policy; Driven by the dilemma, the Modi governments interaction with China in the political, economic and trade, humanities and security fields has shown a trend of pan-securitization.

With the profound changes in the international situation brought about by the Russia-Ukraine crisis, Jaishankar has sent signals to adjust Indians relations with China. Howevet; whether India can. work with China and conduct the China-Indian relationship rationally is uncertain. The future of the China-Indian relationship depends on whether India can shake off its security dilemma in its mindset. This article summarizes the specific manifestations of Indies pan-securitization of issues related to China, explores the internal and external factors behind it, analyzes the Modi governments policy path to deal with the security dilemma, and predicts the direction of Indias foreign policy; especially its China policy amid great changes unprecedented in a century;

Manifestations

Given the unresolved border issues between India and China and their significant national comprehensive power gap, India faces a security dilemma. The dilemma led to a two-track approach to Indias China policy; The first term of the Modi government succeeded in confining the security dilemma within a reasonable scope, reached a consensus with China on a closer partnership, and forged detailed plans based on the 2005 agreement to build a strategic partnership for peace and prosperity. However, in Modis second term, especially after the conflict in the Galvan Valley Indias security dilemma with China has significantly increased and spilled over from traditional security areas to politics, economy and people-to-people exchanges.

Political relations: significant shortcomings in mutual trust

In the first decade of the 21st century, India and China took a positive position on how they viewed each others development and how they positioned their relationship. In the second decade, especially after Modi won the election in 2014, his first term in office has largely continued the positive stance of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government. In September 2014, the Modi government and China agreed to build a closer development partnership. The two countries agreed that their development goals are compatible and their development is mutually reinforcing. They can support each other through a closer partnership based on complementary strengths; cooperation is a core element of the bilateral strategic partnership.

After the June 2020 conflict in the Galvan the security dilemma in Indias China policy magnified, and the perception of China among the Indian general public has become negative. A June 2020 poll showed that as many as 68 percent of respondents in India believe that China poses a greater security problem for India than Pakistan. At the government level, Indias Foreign Minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, in June 2021, called China a “challenging neighbor” in many ways. Indias Chief of Defense Staffs General Bipin Rawat, called China as ‘number one enemy; There is little political mutual trust between the two countries. In response to the future of China-India political relations, former Indian ambassador to China Nirupama Menon Rao said that the political relations would become more adversarial, antagonistic and contentious. Against this backdrop, Indias perceptions of Chinas development have changed significantly.

The Modi government has shifted from a welcoming attitude toward Chinas development to a skeptical and negative one. Instead of recognizing the two countries as mutually beneficial development partners and that their growth is mutually reinforcing, India now believes that China is trying to encircle and restrain India through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It also shifted away from endorsing a mutually supportive approach with complementary strengths to achieve a closer development partnership to a negative approach. The Modi government has implicitly criticized Chinas approach to building a platform for development partnership through the Belt and Road Initiative.

In general, the Modi governments generalized security dilemma with China has led to mutual political distrust with a significant rise in Indias

political suspicion and strategic misgivings toward China. India has treated many bilateral agreements negatively, especially those related to Chinas development, weakening the basis for building a closer development partnership.

Economic relations: attempts to decouple economies or sever supply chains

Under the shadow of geopolitical competition, Indias economic dependence on China has raised security concerns. The Modi governments generalized security dilemma with China has led to attempts to decouple economies and sever supply chains. Mechanisms and arrangements for bilateral economic and trade cooperation have been postponed or shelved. Investment of Chinese companies in India has been restricted and treated unfairly, with their business activities disturbed. In this context, the China-Indian business cooperation mechanisms and arrangements are basically at a standstill, either postponed or shelved. For example, the India-China Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED), the India-China Financial Dialogue (FD), the Joint Group on Economic Relations, Science and Technology (JEG) and many other working groups and dialogues are at a halt. By the end of 2022, there is still no clear sign on whether and when to start the 7th SED, the 10th FD and the 12th JEG.

The Modi government has continued to escalate discriminatory restrictions against Chinese companies. In April 2020, it changed the approval process for foreign investments from countries bordering India from an ‘automatic approval route” to a “‘government approval route” with a strict security review; The move has seriously affected the incentive of Chinese companies to invest in India. India has changed its position on India-China trade relations and Chinese investments since February 2021, and many Chinese investment proposals are still on hold in the approval process. In addition, to further scrutinize the operations of Chinese companies in India, the Indian tax authorities have stepped up investigations and launched a series of malicious prosecutions of Chinese companies, with over 500 Chinese companies under investigation. The Modi government is revising the approval process of foreign investment under the pretext of preventing speculative acquisitions and increasing scrutiny of Chinese investment to protect national security. These moves have led to the continuous shrinkage of Chinese direct investment in India and caused Chinese companies to face multiple risks regarding geopolitics, the convoluted legal system and the shifting business environment when investing in India.

India has banned mobile applications with Chinese backgrounds to avoid so-called security threats. On February 14, 2022, Indias Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, on the recommendation of Indias Ministry of Home Affairs, issued a ban on 54 mobile applications for safeguarding national security under the provisions of the newly amended Information Technology Act. The ban is the fifth since June 2020 that India has blocked applications with a Chinese background, and most of the 321 applications blocked so far have a Chinese background.⁷

While bilateral trade between India and China has bucked the trend and surpassed US$100 billion, Indias perspective on its trade and economic relations with China has focused more on the security dimension. Public opinion in India, especially the hawks, has even argued that India should stop engaging with China in various areas. The Modi government has also tried to increase Indias manufacturing capacity through Production Linkage Incentive (PLI) schemes to free India from its dependence on Chinese imports and significantly increase its GDR However, in contrast to those headwinds, bilateral trade between India and China has reversed two consecutive years of modest negative growth in 2019 and 2020, achieving a scale of US$100 billion six years late.⁸ The total bilateral import and export trade reached US$125.66 billion in 2021, an increase of 43.3 percent from 2020.

India has complex feelings about economic and trade cooperation with China. On the one hand, India is trying to decouple economies and sever supply chains with China and form an India-led industrial chain and supply chain to get rid of its economic dependence on China; on the other hand, India is worried about Chinas dominance in the trade sector and believes that the real challenge is not Indies boycott of Chinese goods, but the fear of Chinas blockade of goods exported to India. As a result, the Indian media even interpreted the nearly US$70 billion trade deficit with China as “China has become an unprecedented threat to India.”It is evident that India no longer sees trade as a key factor contributing to closer bilateral relations. It puts so-called security threats above economic interests and considers China “weaponizing” trade and investment in bilateral relations.

People-to-people exchanges: politicization and securitization

An important part of Chinas policy toward India is promoting people-to-people exchanges. China has always valued bilateral people-to-people exchanges as a vital means to enhance mutual understanding among the people and strengthen bilateral relations. It is fair to say that close people-to-people exchanges have laid a stronger foundation for bilateral relations. However, after the conflict in the Galvan Valley and the persistence of the COVID-19 pandemic, Indias generalized security dilemma with China has begun to spill over into the field of people-to-people exchanges. The Modi government has started to view normal people-to-people exchanges and cooperation from a political and security perspective.

2020 is the Year of the China-India Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges, but the planned in-depth interaction between China and India did not happen. To commemorate the 7Oth-anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries, China and India decided to make 2020 the Year of China-India Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges. They agreed to hold 70 events to highlight the historical ties between the two ancient civilizations and the development of bilateral relations. The real goal is to take the 70th anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations as an opportunity to deepen communication and exchange between the two countries at all levels. Among the 70 planned activities, apart from the legislative bodies and business and defense sectors, people-to-people exchanges between academia, culture circles, and young people are the highlight. However, the planned events failed to materialize due to the dual impact of the pandemic and the conflict in the Galvan Â^lley; People-to-people exchanges between China and India have stayed dormant since 2021.

Chinese Confucius Institutes in India have come under scrutiny. Since August 2020, the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has asked the Indian Ministry of Education to review the Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms in seven Indian universities and 54 Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) signed between Indian higher education institutions and Chinese universities and institutions. All Confucius Institutes are established on the premise of voluntary application by the Indian side. The Chinese and Indian universities then sign a legally binding cooperation agreement under mutual respect, friendly discussion, equality, and mutual benefit. In addition, the Confucius Institutes have always been built with the host country as the main party and the Chinese partner as the co-financing provider.³ Against this backdrop, the Indian Ministry of Education is still reviewing China-India higher education cooperation projects such as the

Confucius Institute. The changing stand indicates that India has politicized routine people-to-people exchanges.

The COVID-19 pandemic is the main reason affecting the 70 planned events celebrating the Year of China-India Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges. But Indias intensified review of Confucius Institutes indicates the politicization of bilateral people-to-people exchanges, coupled with increasingly negative perceptions of China by Indian policymakers, elites and the hardline China policy; The regular people-to-people exchanges between the two countries have shown signs of politicization and securitization. At the same time, some Indian media and analysts have misinterpreted Chinas intention to establish Confucius Institutes in India from a political perspective. Moreover, India has planned to limit Chinas influence by restricting visas, curtailing exchanges among young people, and limiting Confucius Institutes.¹⁴

Motives

The security dilemma is rooted in a states uncertainty about the intentions of its neighboring countries and fear of compromising its sovereignty and national interests. Indeed, Indias security concerns about China are material and ontological, as the conflict in the Galvan \^lley has brought about a sense of ontological insecurity in India. According to ontological security theory, when the stability of the relationship between  border conflict and the unresolved border issues are the main root causes of Indias security dilemma with China Taking all factors discussed thus far, Indias generalized security dilemma with China results from multiple factors, including Indias anxiety about the gap between the comprehensive national power of the two countries and doubts about Chinas strategic intentions.

Unresolved border issues

The China-India border issue is a legacy of history. In recent years, the stalemate in consultations and negotiations between the two countries over the border issue has further aggravated Indias security dilemma with China. The border issue is extremely sensitive, involving national sentiments, prestige, and dignity; It has troubled the development of China-India relations for a long time. India had not recovered from the shadow of the 1962 failed border conflict, and it still harbored a strong sense of insecurity toward China.

There have been increasing border issues between India and China in recent years. It has become more difficult for both countries to implement a border control mechanism to control the situation effectively; The situation presents real challenges to maintaining peace and tranquillity along the border. China and India have strengthened confidence-building operations in the Line of Actual Control (LAC) since the 1990s. They have signed several Confidence Building Measure (CBM) agreements in the military field, including the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control along the China-India Border Areas in September 1993, the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas in November 1996, the Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field in April 2005, and the Agreement on Border Defense Cooperation in October 2013. These agreements allow the two rising powers to set aside territorial disputes and embark on broader political and economic relations, laying the groundwork for maintaining peace and tranquillity along the border. However, these agreements have little effect on fundamentally dissipating Indias insecurity; Indian scholars agree that the standoff in the Galvan Wtley and the subsequent development of the border crisis, especially the increased militarization of the LAC, have solidified Indias perception of the China threat.¹⁸ Some scholars claimed that China uses the border dispute to pressure Indias strategic choices.

Since Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power, India has increasingly deviated from the bilateral consensus on the border issue due to various factors such as Hindu nationalism and the regional and global situation. India has tried to resolve the border issue in its favor and started to pursue an aggressive policy, constantly creating confrontations in the border areas. The mindset change is the background and main reason for the frequent confrontations between India and China on border issues in recent years, further aggravating Indias security dilemma with China. Some Indian scholars attribute Indias security dilemma to the countrys deteriorating relationship with China. They believe that the border dispute with China and the security challenges also shape Indias security dilemma with China.

Widening gap of the comprehensive national power

Comprehensive national power (CNP) is manifested in specific areas such as politics, economy, military and culture. At its core is a countrys overall capability to use its resources in the international arena to achieve national strategic goals. CNP is mainly characterized by economic, military, and diplomatic power in international relations. Economic power is the most important manifestation of CNP and the basis of other power. An important way to exert foreign influence is by influencing or controlling other countries through economic power. The first variable that theoretically determines the outcome of the security dilemma is the material capabilities, especially economic power and the military power supported by superior economic power. Compared to China, India suffers a significant economic and military power gap. The shortcoming leads to Indias security dilemma with China and fosters the pan-securitisation trend.

India is anxious about the gap between its economic power and China. Although China and India are both rising economies, there is a development gap between the two countries. China and Indias changing CNP or material capability have tipped the balance of power in favor of China. Indias development lag and long-standing attempts to catch up with China have led to rising anxiety about China. Most Indian scholars use economic power disparity and “economic power asymmetry” to explain the current state of the unbalanced China-India power and its impact on Indias security dilemma. For example, some scholars believe that “perhaps the most prominent difference between Indias CNP and that of China is their economic capacity：* Other scholars also attribute the power asymmetry as the reason why China and India cannot be friends, arguing that China is far ahead of India and the gap in terms of GDP will continue to widen in the coming decades. This power gap puts China in an advantageous position.Indias Foreign Minister S Jaishankar mentioned in a speech at Columbia University on September 21, 2022, that “In our times, the biggest change we have seen in the world is the rise of China, no question about it,” adding that “China has risen faster, more dramatically in the same time. Thus, while Indian academics and politicians credit Chinas economic growth, they are also anxious about the obvious economic gap between India and China.

India is also concerned about Chinas military capabilities backed by its economic strength. An Indian scholar said, “The overall balance of military power has changed markedly between 1962 to 2020, and the military capabilities are increasingly tilted in favor of China, with the latest figures showing a three-to-one ratio between the two. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a British think tank, thanks to Chinas steady economic growth in recent years, Chinas military spending will reach US$207.3 billion in 2021, ranking second in the world. Despite ranking third in the world, Indias military spending will be only US$65.1 billion. India is under pressure from Chinas military modernization in the new era and the disparity between the size of military expenditures of the two countries.

Indias concerns are twofold: the first is Indias military disadvantage in the border areas, and the second is Chinas naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Indian military sources pointed out as early as 2012 that with Chinas modernization, there is a growing “capability asymmetry” between the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and the Indian military on the LAC operations. In addition, there is a consensus in the Indian strategic community that India is more vulnerable to Chinas growing military power on its land borders and in the maritime domain today; The fear of a growing capability gap is an important motivation for Indias shift from ”deterrence by denial” to “‘deterrence by punishment^, in its military strategy toward China.

Power asymmetry has led to Indias rising security dilemma with China and expanded to the asymmetry of threat perception widely recognized by the academic community; Despite different perceptions of power asymmetry based on economic power, power asymmetry and Chinas great advantage have been enduring features of India-China relations. Indias weak position naturally leads to a greater threat perception of China.⁸ In particular, Indian scholars have found that the China-India competition intensifies as the gap between CNP widens.²⁹ The gap is an important factor contributing to Indias insecurity; The asymmetry in threat perception leads to an asymmetric security dilemma, as India tends to be deeply concerned about threats from China. At the same time, China seems less concerned about threats from India.

Perceptions of China’s strategic intentions

Perceptions are an important factor shaping security dilemmas, which will be exacerbated when a states increased capabilities and influence are perceived as hostile or carry negative historical precedents. The 1962 border conflict is a negative historical precedent. Chinas rapid increase in comprehensive power has also led to an amplified bias in Indias perceptions of Chinas strategic intentions. In the perception of the Indian public, China remains a power with suspicious intentions. There are concerns over the security challenges posed by Chinas military modernization underpinned by its economic growth. India even agrees with the US s perception of China as a revisionist and aggressive military power.³⁰ The conflict in the Galvan Wiley became an important shift in Indias negative perception of China, after which the Indian people tended to have a negative perception of China.

First, Indias public opinion polls on China are becoming more negative. Indias anti-China opinion has reached a pitch after the conflict in the Galvan Wlley. In August 2020, India Today released the results of its National Sentiment Survey that showed an overwhelming 84 percent of respondents believe that China is “betraying” India, 91 percent believe that the Indian governments ban on Chinese applications and refusal to sign contracts with Chinese companies is the right way to counter Chinese “aggression,” and 67 percent said they are prepared to pay higher prices for goods not made in China.3i Even a year later, in August 2021, a poll of Indian youth released by the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), an Indian think tank, found that 77 percent of respondents considered China to be the “least trusted power”70 percent were “concerned or worried” about Chinas rise, and 78 percent ‘supported or strongly supported” the Modi governments policies toward China.² These two polls show that Indias public opinion toward China has become significantly negative, and distrust of China has sharply increased in the past two years.

Second, Indian elites, especially the academia, also look at China from a realist geopolitical perspective and tend to perceive China negatively; For a long time, there have been two main views in Indian academia about China-India relations: one is the realist paradigm, which holds that as the two countries grow in power, their power competition will be inevitable; the other is the liberal paradigm, which holds that multilateral engagement and economic interdependence will lead to a more moderate strategic competition between India and China.³ However, since China overtook Japan to become the worlds second-largest economy, the perception of Indian elites toward China has shifted toward realism. Indian scholars argue that realists are better than liberals.³⁴ They believe that China has posed a geopolitical threat to Indias northern border, Indias leadership in South Asia, and maritime security in the Indian Ocean. The so-called China threat theory has become a heated topic in India, Most analyses have focused on the competition between the two countries. This negative perception of China has been reinforced in the aftermath of the Galvan Valley conflict. Some argue that even if China does not have malicious intentions against India, Chinas success still poses a dilemma for India and will infringe on Indias economic and security interests.

Last but not least, Indian policymakers are more cautious about China. With the negative public perceptions of China and the realist perspective, Indian policymakers have become more cautious and conservative in Indias relations with China. Before the escalation of recent tensions, India sought to build a positive relationship with Beijing beyond the border dispute to ensure economic growth, develop mutually beneficial partnerships, and be more inclusive in Chinas presence in the Indo-Pacific region.

“This perception of New Delhi is beginning to change.^>37 The unresolved border dispute and the recurrence of border conflicts, especially in the Galvan have influenced Indias perceptions of China. Negative perceptions of China from the bottom up have weakened the statement arguing for more engagement with China to help ease Indias political pressure.

Policy Options for India’s Security Dilemma

Indias response to the security dilemma is building its strength to counter China. Regarding domestic policy, the new India strategy guides Indias economic and military capacity building. India has expanded its policy initiatives toward neighboring countries in South Asia to compete with China. In the Tndo-Pacifïc” region, India has promoted the Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative against the Belt and Road Initiative, deepening strategic coordination within the ”Indo-Pacific^ framework and expanding the US-Japan-India-Australia Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad).

Strengthening India’s strength to counter China

The rise of China and its growing military power in the past decade has exacerbated Indias security dilemma with China. India has adopted the principle of tic for tat and tries to match the superior Chinese strength. The Modi government has taken several economic and military initiatives to reduce the power gap. On the one hand, it has proposed the new India strategy. The 2018 proposed strategy is based on a vision of a secure, prosperous, and strong India one year before. In 2019, the Indian government set the goal of making India a US$5 trillion economy by 2025, with a timeline of becoming a developed country by 2047. On the other hand, it has actively promoted military reform and strategic transformation to enhance military capacity, especially in the border areas. India has also accelerated infrastructure development on the LAC to gain military control.

India has speeded up its military deployment along the border areas to gain a better military position over China. It began implementing the capability development plan along the Northern border in December 2013, launched the Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force (ITBP) plan in May 2018, and established the Integrated Battle Group in October 2019. After the conflict in the Galvan Wiley, India planned to increase 30,000 troops along the border in July 2020 in response to threats from neighboring countries and redeploy a strike force from the India-Pakistan border to the “Ladakh” region in December. It also announced a 50,000-troop increase along the India-China border in June 2021. India now has about 200,000 troops on the India-China border, an increase of more than 40 percent over 2020. At the same time, India has deployed paramilitary forces along the India-China border, including the Indian Border Security Force, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, and the Indian Special Border Force. One can argue that the current military buildup is unlike previous military deployments aimed at deterring Chinese action; the expanded presence of Indian forces today is intended to provide more options to attack and occupy Chinese territory if necessary.

India has increased infrastructure development in the border areas. Over the past few years, the Modi government has significantly increased the Border Roads Organization (BRO) budget, which is responsible for infrastructure development, to ensure it can complete planned border infrastructure projects. According to Indias Ministry of Finance, BRO was allocated a budget of Rs. 25 billion for 2021-2022, rising to Rs. 35 billion for 2022-2023, an increase of more than 40 percent from the previous fiscal year. The Modi government has approved a central plan to continue upgrading infrastructure in border areas. To implement the plan, the Department of Border Management, managed by the Ministry of Home Affairs, has a budget of Rs, 130.2 billion from 2021-2022 to 2025-2026.

The scale and speed of Indias infrastructure development in the border areas and its military deployment and capabilities have changed significantly in the last two years, and in response to inquiries, Indian Army Chief of Staff M・ M. Naravane stated that the Indian Army is upgrading and developing infrastructure at the border areas to deal with ‘nefarious^ neighbors. The Army has also increased the forces, infrastructures, and weaponry on Northern Front, “Up-gradation and development of infrastructure along the Northern Borders are being carried out holistically and comprehensively.

Increasing policy attractions for neighboring countries in South Asia

India views the South Asian region as its traditional sphere of influence, and it tries to contain Chinas influence over South Asian countries and interfere with Chinas cooperation with regional countries. With Indias pansecuritization toward China, India has been increasing its policy attractions toward its South Asian neighbors to hedge against China and compete with China for regional influence.

India has taken the initiative to ease the stalemate in its relations with Nepal caused by border disputes and stepped up its efforts to woo Nepal. It also sent signals to Pakistan to improve India-Pakistan relations. In May 2020, India-Nepal relations were strained over the border issue. Still, after the Galvan \^lley conflict, India took the initiative to ease the tension with Nepal, especially during the Chinese State Councilor and Defense Minister Wei Fenghes visit to Nepal in November 2020. The Director General of the Bureau of Investigation and Analysis of India, the Chief of Staff of the Indian Army and the Foreign Secretary, visited Nepal one after another. The Modi government has loosened its policy toward Pakistan. It pursued a policy of isolation and repression against Pakistan in the past, and the two countries were almost on the brink of war in 2019. In February 2021, the Defence Ministry of India and Pakistan issued a joint statement agreeing to address core issues and concerns that could disrupt peace and lead to violence. They restarted the ceasefire along the Line of Control and other areas on February 25, 2021.43 There was positive interaction between the leaders of India and Pakistan. In March 2021, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi wrote to Pakistans Prime Minister Imran Khan, expressing that “India desires cordial relations with Pakistan,” and Prime Minister Imran Khan responded with a letter stating that Pakistan wants peaceful and cooperative relations with all its neighbors, including India. In August, Pakistan and India resumed issuing visas to each others diplomats after a 28-month hiatus.

India has two policy considerations in improving its relations with Pakistan: first, India is concerned about the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the return of the Afghan Taliban to power with the support of Pakistan, as well as other geopolitical changes in South Asia; and second, India tries to avoid a possible two-front war with China and Pakistan.

India attaches importance to security cooperation with its South Asian neighbors in the Indian Ocean. It has revived the Colombo Security Conference (CSC) with Sri Lanka and the Maldives. The CSC was initiated by Sri Lanka and launched in 2011 but stalled after the third meeting in 2014. In November 2020, India reactivated the CSC and upgraded the dialogue to the level of national security advisors. In August 2021, India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives held their fifth CSC meeting. Bangladesh, Mauritius and Seychelles are observers for now and possibly will become full members of the mechanism. The CSC aims to strengthen Indias influence in regional security issues and build mutual trust in the security field with Sri Lanka and the Maldives through regular meetings, with the clear intention of limiting Chinese influence.

Proposing and promoting the “Indo-Pacific” Oceans Initiative

India tries to gain a competitive advantage with its strength in the Indian Ocean to compete with China. Prime Minister Modi proposed the ^<<Indo-Pacific^> Oceans Initiative (IPOI) covering seven areas in November 2019. The IPOI facilitates Indias leading role in regional cooperation, especially security cooperation, with “like-minded” countries. In addition, it hedges against Chinas expansion into the Indian Ocean region through the high-quality construction of the Belt and Road Initiative.

India has deepened its cooperation with “like-minded” countries through the IPOI framework to compete with and hedge against Chinas BRI. While redefining Indies priorities in the broader Indo-Pacific region, the IPOI reassesses the assumptions underpinning Indias China policy; The China factor is so obvious in the IPOI that Chinas rise plays an important role in shaping New Delhis vision of a free and open “Indo-Pacific.^>45 The rise of China pushes India to focus its efforts on dealing with it. Indies leadership in the “Indo-Pacifïc” region is a vital approach to weaken Chinas influence in the region. Therefore, India has been actively promoting the IPOI in bilateral, minilateral and multilateral forums, integrating its policies and initiatives through the IPOI framework and leveraging the multi-disciplinary cooperation with “like-minded” countries to compete with or even hedge against Chinas Belt and Road Initiative. India has made some progress in advancing the IPOI, with Australia, Japan, France, Vietnam and the Philippines joining the initiative, but the progress at the minilateral and multilateral levels has been limited. At the bilateral level, India and Russia agreed in a December 2021 joint statement to strengthen consultations on enhancing connectivity between the Eurasian Space, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific region and develop complementarity of bilateral development initiatives.

The IPOI framework helps enhance maritime security cooperation with “like-minded” countries. It is closely linked to Indians maritime security strategy; deeply rooted in an anti-China mindset. Indias perception of the China threat has evolved from the 2007 “Freedom to Use the Seas: Indias Maritime Military Strategy” to the 2015 “Ensuring the Seas: Indias Maritime Security Strategy” which claims that “the likely sources of traditional threats would be from states with a history of aggression against India, and those with continuing disputes or maintaining adversarial postures to Indias national interests. The traditional sources of threat could also extend to nations that can harm Indian interests and display inimical intent against India.”

Indias maritime strategy defines threat in three dimensions: the first is countries with which India has historically been in conflict; the second is countries with which India has real differences; and the third is countries that have the intention to resist India and the ability to harm Indian interests. Indias maritime strategy targets China. The Indian military has even long exaggerated the so-called China threat and positioned China as the biggest long-term competitor. Strengthening maritime cooperation with “like-minded^,, countries through the IPOI is part of Indias response to the threat. Joint military exercises have also become an important mechanism for maritime security cooperation. The Malabar joint maritime exercises led by India and the US in August 2021 began to serve as a platform for the US-Japan-India-Australia quadrilateral security cooperation. The India-led naval exercise Milan in February 2022 expanded in scale, with more than 40 countries participating and the US taking part in the exercise for the first time. The mechanism, scale, and types of exercises have all upgraded since the conflict in the Galvan Valley.

Strengthening the Quad strategic cooperation

India views the Quad Security Dialogue as a platform addressing global challenges and common concerns. It is also the countrys primary means of addressing strategic competition and geopolitical challenges in the ^<cIndo-Pacifîc” region. India has also pursued a flexible and multidimensional strategy for the “Indo-Paciflc” region through bilateral and minilateral frameworks. It has strengthened trilateral strategic consultations with the US, Japan and Australia and actively participated in the trilateral security cooperation arrangements led by the US and its allies and the institutionalization of the Quad Security Dialogue.

India has deepened bilateral security cooperation with the United States, Japan, and Australia and expanded bilateral and trilateral strategic cooperation.

In bilateral security cooperation, since 2020, India has signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) on Geospatial Cooperation with the United States, the Mutual Logistics Support Arrangement (MLSA) and the Defense Science and Technology Implementing Arrangement of the Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation with Australia, and the Agreement on Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services with Japan. In addition, India has established two trilateral strategic dialogue mechanisms with the US and its allies: the US-Japan-India dialogue and the Japan-Australia-India dialogue. India has also actively established the “India-Australia plus” and ^India-Japan plus” mechanisms. For instance, India, Australia and France have established a trilateral consultation, and India, Japan and Italy have also established a trilateral consultation. India has also promoted the India-Australia-Indonesia trilateral consultation.

India has actively participated in institutionalizing and expanding the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. On the one hand, the Quad has actively sought to expand its membership to “4十N； and from March to May 2020, the four Quad countries held several rounds of “Quad十”Deputy Foreign Minister dialogues in different configurations with the Republic of Korea, Vietnam, and New Zealand. On the other hand, the Quad has significantly accelerated its institutionalization, with various institutional arrangements, including summits, foreign ministers⁵ meetings and senior officials’ meetings, already in place. Since the first Quad summit in March 2021, four summits have been held (March 2021 online, September 2021 in 阪云hington, D・C.， March 2022 online interim summit, and May 2022 in Tokyo, Japan). At the same time, the Quad mechanism has been expanding its cooperation fields, especially at the \C^shington Summit, where the four countries decided to deepen cooperation in seven areas, including the anti-pandemic efforts and global health, infrastructure, climate change, people-to-people exchanges and education, critical and emerging technologies, cybersecurity and space.

In the past, India was seen as the weak link in Quad. During the pandemic, India began accelerating its integration into the Quad agenda with the intensifying US-China strategic game and the setback in China-India relations. India has increasingly become a key partner in Quad with the significant institutionalization of Quad and the expansion of the Quads containment against China from the military into the areas of ideology, infrastructure, high technology, and global supply chains.

Conclusion

The Modi government is pursuing a dual-track policy emphasizing economic cooperation and strategic balance with China. However, the generalization of Indias security dilemma with China in the wake of the conflict in the Galvan Wiley has led the Modi government to shift its China policy toward strategic competition and hedge against China. Despite the positive signals from India to restore diplomatic relations with China, there is still great uncertainty about the Modi governments China policy; Indias security dilemma with China has led to the negative impact of both pan-securitization and pan- politicization of China-India relations, with impacts extending to political, economic and cultural fields. Indies security dilemma with China has broadened from security to political, economic, and humanistic spheres. Geographically; it has extended from land borders to maritime areas. It has also extended from bilateral to minilateral and multilateral levels with a bias toward expanding scope. These are all constraints against restoring normal relations between the two countries.

The generalization of Indias security dilemma toward China has a notable negative impact on the development of bilateral relations, the situation in South Asia and the future of Asia. It has led to a negative perception of China in India, The earlier consensus that, “China and India are not a threat to each other but partners which offer development opportunities to each other” is a faint voice now. It is difficult for China-India relations to return to a normal track.

India views Chinas BRI as a geopolitical and strategic tool to encircle India. It has negatively responded to the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor, the China-Nepal-India Economic Corridor, and the “China-India Plus” cooperation. If India, with its security dilemma, adheres to an old mindset of regional hegemony and sees Chinas interaction with South Asia as a zero-sum game rather than a win-win situation, then there will be an inevitable competition between China and India over regional influence. Moreover, the generalization of Indias security dilemma with China also may lead to extraterritorial intervention in regional affairs and even camp confrontation in South Asia. It is difficult to realize the ‘”Asian century” if China and India dont develop and work together. While development and cooperation between the two countries are indispensable, Indias security dilemma with China is undoubtedly a negative factor in achieving the Asian Century.

Indias security dilemma with China persists, but its pan-securitization of the economy and people-to-people exchanges result from contingencies and specific circumstances. India is trying to decouple China in trade and investment, but the bilateral trade volume still exceeds 100 billion dollars, indicating the two countries’ strong economic interdependence. At the same time, although India still conflates the Belt and Road Initiative with Chinese trade and investment, the capital and technology brought by Chinese investment offer tangible benefits to India and hold the potential to reduce long-term tensions. India rejects the BRI but actively participates in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank initiated by China. The move shows India still wants to benefit from economic and trade cooperation with China. Therefore, Indias position on Chinese investment and bilateral trade and economic cooperation may return to pragmatism and rationality in the near future. However, it is undeniable that the tensions after the conflict in the Galvan valley and the border standoff have inhibited the timing and extent of Indias return to pragmatism and rationality.

The interdependence between China and India brings synergy opportunities and can alleviate security dilemmas but cannot fundamentally resolve the security dilemmas. Power asymmetry is a distinctive feature of China-India relations, and it will continue to exist and may even expand further. China hopes India will view Chinas development positively and take up the border issue rationally.