New Developments in US Arctic Strategy and Their Implications for Arctic Governance
With the increasing strategic relevance of the Arctic region in the international system, the United States, as the global hegemon and also an Arctic country, has gradually viewed the region as an important arena to address its alleged security threats and conduct majorpower competition. The Biden administrations new National Strategy for the Arctic Region, released in October 2022, articulates Americas strategic goals and action plan for the next decade on Arctic affairs? Amid the constantly evolving order in the Arctic region, the United States’ adjustment of its Arctic strategy will have critical implications for the regional geopolitical landscape and the prospects of Arctic governance.
New Characteristics of US Arctic Strategy
Arctic strategy has taken an increasingly prominent position in the United States5 national strategic layout. The Biden administrations National Security Strategy; also published in October 2022, listed “Maintain a Peaceful Arctic” as one of Americas seven strategic directions by region for the first time? Historically; the US issued four Directives on Arctic Region Policy in 1971, 1983, 1994, and 2009 respectively; and released the first US National Strategy for the Arctic Region in 2013. In comparison, the 2022 US National Arctic Strategy makes significant adjustments while inheriting the previous American strategic layout in the region, with planning in both domestic and international dimensions for the US agenda on Arctic affairs, lb guide actions within the four major pillars of security, climate change and environmental protection, sustainable economic development, and international cooperation and governance, the new strategy stresses five principles: consult, coordinate, and co-manage with Alaska Native Tribes and communities; deepen relationships with allies and partners; plan for long lead-time investments; cultivate cross-sectoral coalitions and innovative ideas; and commit to a whole-of-government, evidence-based approach. Several new characteristics of the US Arctic strategy can be found by reading the latest strategic document and looking at the Biden administrations recent practices on Arctic affairs.
Balancing competition and cooperation in the Arctic through the lens of strategic rivalry
“Arctic exceptionalism” is a notion proposed by some scholars in the area of Arctic studies, under which the Arctic comes to be understood as “a unique region detached, and encapsulated, from global political dynamics” and characterized as “an apolitical space of regional governance, functional cooperation, and peaceful co-existence.’” For a long time, such a perspective was consistent with the United States5 and other Arctic countries perceptions. In the 2013 version of the US National Strategy for the Arctic Region, the Arctic was defined as “peaceful, stable, and free of conflict.% With the intensification of great-power competition in recent years, however, the US perception and positioning of the Arctic regions geopolitical status have been gradually changing. During a visit to Finland in 2019, then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declared that the Arctic has changed fundamentally from a region featuring cooperation and a low level of tension to one involving “power and competition.”’ The US Department of Defense Arctic Strategy published in June of the same year defined the Arctic for the first time as a “potential corridor for strategic competition.” Nowadays, as the spillover of the Ukraine crisis leads to confrontation and division between Russia and other Arctic countries, the US has become more aware of the regions security importance. The perspective of “strategic compétition5 in understanding the Arctic thus continues, and was formally endorsed in the latest document that lays out the US Arctic strategy for the next ten years. The new National Strategy for the Arctic Region “acknowledges increasing strategic competition in the Arctic since 2013” and ‘seeks to position the United States to both effectively compete and manage tensions.”‘
Under the US narrative of strategic competition, the increasing activities of China and Russia in the region become the root of the changing Arctic landscape, and the US layout in the Arctic is defensive and responsive in nature. With regard to Russia, the United States’ primary concerns are its continued defense investments in the region over the past decade, and its control over the Northern Sea Route (NSR). With regard to China, the new US National Arctic Strategy claims that China ‘seeks to increase its influence in the Arctic through an expanded slate of economic, diplomatic, scientific, and military activities,” and accuses it of using these scientific engagements to “conduct dual-use research with intelligence or military applications in the Arctic.” Meanwhile, the US has been trying to bind China and Russia together and hype the so-called “threat” the two countries pose to the Arctic, using the closer Sino-Russian relationship and their enhanced cooperation on the Arctic as justifications. There exists the idea that Chinese investments and technologies in the Arctic play an important role in protecting Russias security interests, and that the two countries Arctic cooperation in some areas helps Russia address the challenges from NATO.
Notably the perceptional framework adopted by the Biden administration in its Arctic strategy has inherited the crucial concept of “competition” from the Trump era and continues to regard the Arctic as an arena for major-power strategic competition, albeit with a different practical approach. The Trump administration upheld a more confrontational policy line and resorted to unilateralism on some issues of regional and global governance. In contrast, the Biden administration, recognizing the diversity of Arctic security threats and the cross-regional nature of their causes and implications, continues to stress the feasibility of international cooperation under the framework of strategic competition. To some extent, its Arctic strategy integrates the previous US layouts in the region to maximize American national interests.
Maintaining Arctic security while promoting Arctic development
Security and development are the dual themes of US Arctic strategy.
In both the new National Strategy for the Arctic Region and the National Security Strategy, the US has identified the severe security threats from the Arctic region, including the challenges to the US brought about by increasing military tensions amid great-power competition, and the risks in non-traditional security domains such as climate and ecology. In August 2022, the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies, focusing on the implications of both geopolitics and climate change for Arctic security, was established by the US Department of Defense.10 The 2022 US Arctic strategy is different from its previous version in 2013, which had a peaceful and low-profile tone; it also draws a stark contrast to the disdain shown for non-traditional security issues during the Trump era. To address the traditional security risks in the Arctic, the US has not only been working on security capacity building, but has also been pursuing greater military influence under bilateral and multilateral frameworks — this includes regular joint exercises in the Arctic with allies and partners, and the support for a greater role of NATO in the region. In terms of non-traditional security, the US is paying special attention to the ecological destruction and infrastructure damage caused by climate change, and has proposed two solutions: helping Alaskan communities adapt to the new environment, and mitigating global warming by proposing emissions reduction initiatives. Besides addressing security challenges, achieving sustainable economic development constitutes another pillar of Americas Arctic strategy. Given that diminishing sea ice provides new economic opportunities for the Arctic, the latest US Arctic strategy has proposed several supporting measures, including investment in advanced telecommunications infrastructure and harbors, improvement of Alaskan communities’ access to services such as healthcare and education, development of emerging economic sectors such as tourism, and cooperation with allies and partners to increase responsible Arctic investment.
As security and development are highly interdependent, US planning on security issues and on sustainable development issues are inevitably intertwined, a feature which has become more prominent recently. On the one hand, it relies on development to realize Americas goals on Arctic security; The measures of enhancing infrastructure investment in Alaska, renovating harbors and airfields, and improving communications facilities not only facilitate economic development but also meet the needs of US defense and enable the US to project military presence and influence in the Arctic. For example, the US will support development of a deep draft harbor in Nome, which would open access for future US naval assets, including the Coast Guards planned multi-mission icebreakers, and thus serve US
To maintain energy and economic security, the new National Strategy for the Arctic Region will seek to strengthen the resilience of US supply chains by exploring the potential for sustainable and responsible critical mineral production in Alaska. On the other hand, security considerations are behind the Arctic development planning. In fact, addressing non-traditional security threats in the environment and climate areas is an inherent part of the concept of sustainable development. To protect Arctic ecological security, the US has put multiple measures in place, including developing renewable energy and adhering to the highest environmental standards in mineral production. On the issue of economic cooperation, the new strategy also pledges to work with Arctic allies and partners to protect critical infrastructure and improve investment screening for national security purposes.
Changing attitudes toward domestic and international Arctic cooperation
Domestically, the US tries to integrate the increasingly diverse governance actors under the guidance of the government, and highlights the special value of the Alaskan region and its native communities in Arctic governance. First, the US strengthens its governance capacity building by adjusting the operational structure and cooperation patterns on Arctic affairs. The new National Strategy for the Arctic Region makes it clear that the challenges and opportunities in the Arctic cannot be solved by national governments alone, and that the US should strengthen and build on coalitions of the private sector, academia, civil society, and state and local actors to tackle these challenges. Joint efforts by different departments and agencies of the federal government are also needed. On investment in the region, the strategy proposes enabling enhanced US government support for strategic investments and incentivizing private sector investment in the Arctic. To this end, the US has given greater play to the role of the public service system on the one hand, by encouraging the Export-Import Bank, the US International Development Finance Corporation, and the US Trade and Development Agency to invest in the Arctic and formulate relevant planning. On the other hand, it has underscored the initiative of the private sector in investment, in pursuit of economic sustainability in the region. Second, the US has attached more importance to the State of Alaska and Alaska Native communities in advancing regional sustainable development. The latest strategy lists Consult, Coordinate, and CoManage with Alaska Native Tribes and Communities” as the first among the five principles of the American Arctic strategy. It is the first time that the notion of “co-management” with native communities appears in a US Arctic strategic document. At the same time, the Biden administrations practice on Arctic affairs has also reflected its emphasis on the role of the Alaskan region. Among the six commissioners of the Arctic Research Commission it appointed, one-third are Arctic indigenous people and two-thirds are residents of Alaska. The Arctic Executive Steering Committee, reactivated in September 2021, also highlights the collaborative partnership with Alaska Native communities, and harnesses science and indigenous knowledge to inform management and policy;
In terms of international cooperation, the Biden administration has revised the unilateralist approach of the Trump era, but its attitude toward cooperation is still highly value-oriented- Preferring multilateral cooperation in addressing some global governance issues, the Biden administration advocates sustaining the Arctic Council and other institutions for Arctic cooperation, and more active engagement with relevant countries. In contrast to the attention given non-Arctic countries in the 2013 strategy, the new National Strategy for the Arctic Region focuses mostly on US allies and partners in terms of international cooperation, which include all other Arctic countries except Russia ——Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. The US is committed to expanding cooperation with allies and partners in multiple areas including politics, military, economics and technology, to construct all-round interaction, and reinforce American influence. For non-Arctic countries, however, the US has attached strings to cooperation, requiring them to “uphold international law, rules, norms, and standards in the region.” While the international law reflects the common interests of the international community and is universally binding, what the US declares as “rules, norms, and standards” are generally vague in meaning and subject to unilateral interpretation by the US, which inevitably conforms to American value preferences and serves American national interests. Regarding the attitude toward cooperation with China, for example, the US has been hyping Chinas expanding influence in the Arctic and the potential military applications of its scientific activities, remaining alert to any cooperation with China. In practice, the US has also been sensationalizing the narrative of “techno-authoritarianism” in order to introduce ideological factors into the economic, technological, and security competition with China.
Motives behind the Strategic Adjustment
The newly unveiled US National Strategy for the Arctic Region creates a framework for the US government in response to the new opportunities and challenges in the region. Several considerations have contributed to the US adjustment of its Arctic strategy.
Addressing increasingly prominent Arctic security risks
In the Arctic region, the US perceives a simultaneous increase of both traditional and non-traditional security risks, and a significant rise of the probability of these risks escalating into real conflicts. This, according to the US, has posed threats to the national security of Arctic stakeholders including the US and its allies. For the US, ensuring that the security risks in the region are generally under control not only serves its homeland security concerns, but is also a commitment to the security of its allies. To this end, the security perspective has gradually come to the forefront in the US strategic assessment of the Arctic. In its latest Arctic strategy, the US has identified two aspects of security risks.
First, the escalation of disputes and the increasing possibility of conflicts in the Arctic have required more in the capability of the US to safeguard its Arctic security interests and those of its allies. The changing Arctic security landscape is first reflected in the accelerating militarization, which impacts regional stability; To strengthen their defense and mitigate their security anxiety, Russia and the US-led NATO countries have stepped up the arms race and bloc confrontation, a trend which has only gained more momentum after the Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out. Since then, Sweden and Finland have filed applications to join NATO and pursue closer defense cooperation with the US. This has further destabilized the already fragile balance of power in the Arctic geostrategic landscape. In addition, ongoing international disputes over Arctic resources have added to regional instability; On the issues of continental shelf delimitation, navigational rights on Arctic sea routes, and the interpretation and application of the Svalbard Treaty, disputes have endured between multiple parties including the US, and each side is unwilling to concede on issues concerning national sovereign rights. Moreover, peaceful settlement of these disputes has become more difficult. While the possibility of a “hot war” in the Arctic remains low, prevalent security misgivings have damaged the atmosphere for mutual trust and cooperation. As current governance mechanisms including the Arctic Council have been temporarily paralyzed, the space for dispute resolution through dialogue and cooperation has been substantially squeezed.
Second, the US is also faced with increasingly significant non-traditional security threats in the Arctic, and the combination of traditional and non-traditional security threats has only made governance more urgent and more challenging. The Biden administrations National Security Strategy identifies climate change as the most severe common challenge facing the international community; Climate change has brought major risks to the Alaskan natural system and to US Arctic activities, and its influence on Americas national defense has also gained more attention. In an interview, US Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks indicated the challenges climate change poses to US flying of its warplanes and use of its military installations in the Arctic.16 Moreover, the deterioration of Arctic ecology has brought negative impacts to the traditional subsistence lifestyles of Alaskan Native communities. The supply chain disruptions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic have raised the alarm to Arctic food security and energy security; The military confrontation between the US-led West and Russia is also spilling over into cyberspace. All these emerging non-traditional security issues require US attention when it adjusts its Arctic strategy.
Ensuring American superiority and leadership in the Arctic and global order
For some time in the post-Cold era, the US was perceived as “the reluctant Arctic power” due to its lack of will and capacity in Arctic governance. Despite its increasing focus on Arctic affairs in recent years, the US is still in a disadvantaged position in many areas, which has restrained its ability to safeguard its rights and interests and effectively govern the region» For example, high ice-breaking capacity is the premise for military and commercial activities in the Arctic, but compared to Russias 41 icebreakers, the US Coast Guard currently has only 2 cutters capable of operating in heavy polar ice, both of which have been in service for more than two decades?8 To reverse the undesirable situation, the latest National Strategy for the Arctic Region proposes to enhance Americas comprehensive influence in the Arctic in terms of military, economy, infrastructure, science, and diplomacy. With an improved competitive edge, the US will be better positioned to safeguard its rights and interests in the Arctic and play a dominant role in the Arctic order.
The objectives set out in the US Arctic strategy are in fact embedded into the countrys global strategic goals. The pursuit of dominance in the Arctic region is essentially intended to consolidate the American leadership in the global order. After the frequent withdrawal from international organizations and agreements and the unilateralist moves during the Trump era under the philosophy of ‘”America First” have eroded the US global leadership, it has become a theme of the Biden administrations foreign policy to return to the leadership position in the building of a arules-based international order.” As one scholar pointed out, “The Arctic, which used to be the ultimate periphery, is slowly but surely turning into a center — a center of economic activity and investment, a shipping hub, a transit point between areas of strategic interest, and a military chokepoint.n 19 Moreover, an increasing number of participants among which China and Russia, both identified by the US as strategic rivals, have been more prominent in Arctic affairs, and have stepped up their Arctic cooperation. In this context, establishing American dominance in the Arctic order is relevant to preserving the US hegemony globally, and enhancing the American presence and superiority in Arctic multilateral governance thus becomes a major component of the US Arctic strategy. On the one hand, the Biden administration regards issues of common concern such as climate change and fisheries as arenas in which they can project American leadership in the process of international cooperation; on the other hand, it attempts to bind its allies with its militaristic moves by demonizing China and Russia and thus consolidate its influence and dominance over the allies.
Building capacity for Arctic governance
Previously, the practices of US Arctic strategy were often subject to disagreement between different departments or levels of government, which added to the uncertainty in implementation. To bridge the gap between strategic planning and implementation, the US government is now making efforts to coordinate the different forces and enhance its capacity in Arctic governance to a level that matches its strategic objectives.
The first task is to bridge the gap between the federal government and the Alaskan region. The US territorial sovereignty over Alaska is the geographical precondition for its Arctic country status, and the premise for all its rights in the Arctic and its pursuit of leadership in the regional order. However, for a long time, the development of Alaska has lagged far behind that of the continental United States due to its detached geographical location and other limitations. Protecting the rights of local people to subsistence and development thus becomes the priority of the state government. Meanwhile, the federal governments objectives in Arctic governance are by no means limited to the development of the Arctic region under US jurisdiction; rather, specific Arctic issues are considered in the context of the countrys overall interests and the broader architecture of regional governance, which leads to persistent disagreement between the federal government and the Alaskan state government over agendasetting. During its chairmanship at the Arctic Council in 2015, the US once prioritized climate issues on the agenda. This led to protests by some political forces in the State of Alaska, who called for more attention to regional economic development and infrastructure improvement.20 According to the US Constitution, while foreign policy-making is a power belonging to the federal government, there remains space for state and local diplomatic participation.21 The disputes and competition between the Alaskan state government and the federal government have impeded the implementation of Americas Arctic strategy. Therefore, the Biden administrations Arctic strategy has given more consideration to Alaskas appeal for development and more voice to local residents in order to expand the convergence of interests and objectives between federal and state governments.
The second task is to coordinate the domestic actions of different departments on Arctic affairs. Given the complex nature of Arctic issues, there exists an overlapping of jurisdiction between the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, whose positions on the diplomatic, security, and internal dimensions of Arctic affairs respectively have yet to be reconciled. To solve the problem, the Obama administration set up the Arctic Executive Steering Committee to coordinate the positions of different departments, agencies, regions, and organizations, and increase the governments policy-making efficiency on Arctic affairs. Under the Trump administration, however, the committee was dissolved in 2017 due to an alleged lack of effectiveness, at the same time that the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, as well as the US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard released their separate Arctic strategies. These documents were not fully coordinated or integrated before their releases, and were sometimes the result of domestic political pressure. Therefore, the successive Biden administration has found it an urgent task to change the fragmented structure of Arctic governance. In September 2021, the Arctic Executive Steering Committee was reactivated to coordinate the US position on Arctic affairs internally; Externally, the Biden administration has planned to elevate the Arctic Coordinator position by appointing an Ambassador-at-Large for the Arctic Region, who will be the full-time diplomatic representative on US Arctic affairs charged with promoting cooperation with allies and partners.
Prospects of Arctic Governance amid US Strategic Adjustment
In the post-Cold era, the Arctic region was once an arena for international dialogue and cooperation under the coordinated governance of multiple stakeholders. Regional governance mechanisms, represented by the Arctic Council, witnessed significant development and achieved substantial outcomes. However, with the drastic transformation of Arctic geopolitics, great-power competition has been exerting increasing influence in the region, even though it was traditionally not a source of severe conflicts between great powers?6 The dynamics of Arctic governance is thus put in the context of great-power competition. As a crucial participant of great influence in Arctic governance, the US with its Arctic strategy is significantly reshaping the way the region is governed.
A more complicated landscape for security and development governance
First, Arctic security governance will face new difficulties. On the one hand, traditional security governance in the region will be subject to more severe challenges. In recent years, the US and Russia have been vying to increase their military presence in the Arctic in order to establish effective strategic deterrence based on military superiority; In the latest National Strategy for the Arctic Region, the US once more played up Russias military threat and advocated strengthened military deployment, which will inevitably intensify the arms race and the security dilemma for the region. At the same time, it will be even less likely for Russia and the US-led Western countries to set up any security dialogue or cooperation mechanism in the Arctic. Currently, the US is more committed to enhancing NATOs influence in the region. While responding to the appeal of its European allies and partners to reinforce defense capabilities, the US is taking advantage of its alliance network to align European countries more closely with American interests and strategic deployment. Driven by both Europes security demands and the US pursuit of its interests, NATO has been accelerating its foray into the Arctic region as part of its strategic transformation, which will trigger the escalation of security confrontation between Russia and the West. Therefore, despite a persistent call for the establishment of security dialogue mechanisms in the Arctic to fill the gap in traditional security governance, the vision is unlikely to materialize in the short term. The foundation that once underpinned the perspective of “Arctic exceptionalism” has been significantly eroded, and traditional security governance in the region may encounter even more difficulties in the future. In particular, the US-Russia dispute over the freedom of navigation on the NSR is likely to escalate into a low-intensity conflict.
On the other hand, even non-traditional security governance in the Arctic is impeded by increasing obstacles. The present Arctic governance has become more global in nature, especially in non-traditional security areas such as climate and environment, where outcomes are prone to spill over and where participation by multiple actors is greatly needed.27 Ensuring American leadership under the multilateral governance system is a major goal of US Arctic strategy To this end, the US recognizes the importance of Arctic cooperation, but its latest moves have demonstrated a tendency to set up small groups or exclusive blocs based on ideology. Such fragmentation of Arctic cooperation hinders positive interactions between stakeholders on relevant issues, and is not conducive to fundamentally addressing the bottlenecks in Arctic non-traditional security governance.
Second, Arctic development governance will witness more tensions as the demand for cooperation increases while the space for cooperation narrows. Promoting the exploration and utilization of Arctic resources is an important path for Arctic countries to realize economic recovery and improve the well-being of the indigenous population. All Arctic countries, including the US and Russia, have incorporated Arctic development into their national strategies. The increase of relevant activities such as navigation and mining has also made cooperation more necessary in Arctic development governance. However, the intensifying confrontation between individual regional countries has subjected such cooperation to manipulation based on politicized, securitized or even militarized perceptions. Nikolay Korchunov, Russias Senior Arctic Official to the Arctic Council, publicly accused NATO of increasingly interfering in the economic cooperation of other countries in the Arctic. On the issue of NSR development, Russia aims to build the NSR into the countrys maritime transport artery and an important international maritime transport corridor, and adopted in August 2022 a development plan to 2035・ But the US-led comprehensive sanctions have made it difficult for Russia to make any progress in terms of trade export, fleet construction, and resource exploitation, thus suffocating the NSR development. Nordic countries are also constrained in Arctic economic development. For a long time, their cooperation with China in terms of investment and infrastructure has well served their development needs. But as the US now takes the geopolitical competition with China as an important part of its Arctic strategy, and stigmatizes Chinese investment and scientific activities on national security grounds in order to obstruct Chinas normal cooperation with other Arctic states, effective development governance is hard to come by for Nordic Arctic countries, lb some extent, this also reflects the inconsistency of US interests and objectives with those of its Arctic allies on some issues, and it remains uncertain whether the current practice in the region will lead to a vision of Arctic governance that features American leadership. Moreover, should the US perceptions and actions go to further extremes with the intensification of great-power competition, a multitude of governance objectives proposed by the US are bound to encounter more restraints. What’s more, it may undermine American governance capability, leadership, and national interests on many Arctic and even global issues.
An uncertain future for regional governance mechanisms
As the center of the institutional structure for regional governance, the Arctic Council has been playing a major role in multiple areas of Arctic governance for nearly three decades. However, the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis has placed it in deep trouble. Currently, there exist two major opinions on the direction of the Arctic Council» One advocates building a new Arctic governance mechanism that excludes Russia. A Finnish scholar discussed the possibility of “Nordic Plus” by the seven Arctic countries, namely all the current Arctic Council members except Russia, to advance cooperation based on common values. The other opinion advocates maintaining the stable operation of the Arctic Council and other current governance mechanisms in the region. According to a RAND report in May 2022, a potential adverse outcome of the current paralysis of the Arctic Council could be a push from Russia for a new (or drastically changed) Arctic governance institution, where other Arctic-interested states, such as China, might have a louder voice. The report recommended the US to “explore the conditions and possible pathways for restoring some level of engagement with Russia on Arctic issues in the wake of its war on Ukraine.’”
In essence, the future of the Arctic Council hinges on the positions of the US and Russia. Russia consistently supports maintaining the Councils normal operation, claiming that Arctic cooperation should be insulated from the tensions in other regions. During its rotating presidency in the Council in 2022, Russia actively held a series of events and established new mechanisms for scientific research cooperation, including the InterUniversity Consortium of Arctic Policy and Legal Studies and the Russian-Asian Consortium for Arctic Research.31 For Russia, such a position obviously aims to mitigate the spillover effect of the Ukraine crisis, and ease the international pressure facing the country. For the Biden Administration, restoring inter-governmental cooperation with Russia on Arctic affairs seems an unrealistic option, at least for the short term, but it still upholds the stability of current governance mechanisms including the Arctic Council, with multiple goals proposed on this basis. The American position can be understood from two perspectives: first, the US is trying to balance its political objectives vis-à-vis Russia against other goals of its Arctic governance; second, it is attempting to preserve the dominant say of Arctic countries on Arctic affairs while undermining Russias influence in the region. Such balances are difficult, and even risky, to keep.
Looking from the positions of all parties concerned, the Arctic Council will remain a relevant and viable organization in the mid-to-long term, and the restoration of dialogue and cooperation between regional stakeholders on multilateral governance issues can still be expected, albeit in a gradual manner and to limited extent. In the short term, however, the difficulties facing the Arctic Council are unlikely to be resolved given the confrontation between Russia and the seven other Council members, and the increasing US perception of the Arctic as an arena for strategic competition. One possible path forward for current Arctic governance would be a greater role on Arctic affairs for global mechanisms such as the International Maritime Organization and the World Meteorological Organization.
Conclusion
Increasingly embedded into the fabric of global governance, Arctic governance has seen its importance continually rise in recent years. In particular, major powers including the US, China and Russia are mostly stakeholders and crucial participants in Arctic affairs. In such a context, a global perspective is required to understand the adjustment of US Arctic strategy and the interaction and competition in the region between major players. The new characteristics of US Arctic strategy are the results of diverse factors at home and abroad, and likely herald a more complicated future for Arctic governance. While the region is inevitably subject to the influence of major-power competition, the necessity and feasibility of international cooperation in Arctic governance should never be underestimated.
The Arctic is becoming another emerging arena for China-US interaction, be it competition or cooperation. The Biden administrations National Security Strategy identifies China as ‘”Americas most consequential geopolitical challenge,” but still stresses the need to cooperate with China on global issues.32 It is on this basis that the US perceives Chinas role in the Arctic and formulates its approach to interaction with China on Arctic affairs. Given the “new normal” in China-US relations and the new prospects of Arctic governance, the two countries should actively conduct dialogues and consultations on maritime law and polar affairs wherever possible, especially on climate and fishery governance, to create opportunities for easing bilateral tensions. At the same time, China should well understand the limit of US Arctic strategy and express its due concern about those statements in the strategy that carry provocative overtones.