China’s Role in the Resumption of Saudi-Iran Diplomatic Relations
On March 10, 2023, China, Saudi Arabia and Iran issued a trilateral joint statement in Beijing, in which Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to resume their diplomatic relations and reopen their embassies and missions within a period not exceeding two months. The Saudi-Iran confrontation has been one of the most intractable regional conflicts in the Middle East. The announcement of the two countries to restore their diplomatic ties resulted from the interplay of several favorable factors and is expected to set off a series of positive developments that might de-escalate many regional hotspot issues in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon.
Chinas mediation in the Saudi-Iran diplomatic rapprochement is one of its major contributions to peace in the Middle East. With the profound transformation of the broader international landscape and the advent of a new era, particularly in the Middle East, major countries in the region have taken initiatives to reconcile and warm up diplomatic relations. China sensed the momentum in this process and played a critical facilitating role based on its time-honored, non-partisan diplomatic reputation* The Saudi-Iran rapprochement will incentivize China to play a more proactive role in the Middle East, help peace and stability in the region, and usher in a new era of Chinese Middle East diplomacy.
International Backgroimd of Saudi-Iran Rapprochement
Major-power relations have entered the most fiercely competitive period recently since the end of the Cold The United States has spared no effort to force other countries into taking sides, while Middle East countries are trying their best to keep a delicate balance among the major powers. The power structure in the region is increasingly becoming a multi-polar one. When the US went through a strategic contraction in the Middle East, China and other major countries placed more importance on the region, with the ties getting closer between China and Middle East countries. Under the growing pressure of the global energy transition, the strategic focus of regional countries has turned from geopolitical competition to economic development, which urgently calls for improving their diplomatic environment. Thanks to the twin driving forces of politics and economics, the Middle East has emerged from the turbulent period of the ‘Arab Spring” in 2011. It is gradually entering a new era characterized by political détente and economic development.
First, with unprecedented tensions between major powers, middle and smaller countries face the pressure of taking sides. Since 2017, the United States’ China policy has witnessed the most dramatic, complicated and chaotic transformation since the two countries established diplomatic relations. The co-existence of cooperation and competition, as seen in the bilateral relationship for decades, is being replaced by the dominance of strategic competition. The change to one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world is consequential.
Following the eruption of the Ukraine Crisis in 2022, the relations between the United States and the European Union on one side and Russia on the other, which had long existed in a “cold peace” status, suddenly deteriorated. The US and the EU imposed all-around sanctions against Russia and continuously provided Ukraine with more sophisticated weapons. The efforts were just one step short of direct military intervention and drew their relations with Russia further toward the brink of a real war. In just a few years, relations between major countries and regions, including the US, the EU, Russia, and China, have undergone significant changes, with unprecedented tensions never seen since the Cold ended. As the report of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China pointed out, aToday, our world, our times, and history are changing in ways like never before. … All of this is posing unprecedented challenges for human society” The latest US National Security Strategy released by the Biden administration in 2022 even explicitly declared, “The post-Cold era is definitively over, and a competition is underway between the major powers to shape what comes next.”
In the new era of great-power competition, major countries are all busy adjusting their foreign policies to shape an international landscape favorable to themselves. The US is consolidating its system of traditional alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia and strengthening the cohesion of G7 and NATO while reactivating the US-Japan-India-Australia quadrilateral mechanism (Quad) and building new alliances such as the Australia-UK-US trilateral security partnership (AUKUS). On the other hand, China is actively working to improve its relations with the US, reiterating that “China-US relations should not be a zero-sum game where one side out-competes or thrives at the expense of the other, and that the world in the 21st century must avoid repeating the mistake of the Cold At the same time, it is trying to win the support of other Western and Third World countries to prevent the US from building an anti-China coalition and avoid the bloc-based fragmentation of international relations.
Despite the global implications of major-power competition, most countries are reluctant to take sides; instead, they try their best to stay independent and protect their right to self-determination. Take the Ukraine Crisis for example» According to an analysis by the Economist Intelligence Unit, 127 nations in the world are categorized as not clearly in either camp, more than the 52 nations that lambast and punish Russias actions (mostly the West and its friends) and the 12 nations that supported Russia. Of the 25 largest economies in the above 127 nations, 8 (Morocco, Algeria, Israel, Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) are in the Middle East region. Most of these countries believe in the volatility of the global balance of power and the meagre resources available for developing states to influence international politics. Amid an unpredictable environment, they dont want to be bound by either side and desperately want to keep the space to turn around at any time.4 They follow a pragmatist approach and adopt the hedging strategy. Rather than building a stable organization or coalition, they adjust their diplomatic positions when and where they see fit. The existence of these countries, which swing between the major powers, has significantly complicated international relations.
Second, with the accelerating pace of the global energy transition, the pressure is mounting for Middle East countries to carry out economic transition. In recent years, different sovereign nations and transnational corporations have scrambled to propose ambitious new energy visions and strived to play a pioneering role in policy investment and technology; The energy transition is gaining momentum on a global scale. Research shows that the energy shortage caused by the Ukraine Crisis has failed to slow the energy transition; instead, it has accelerated the process by five to ten years.
The global energy transition is bound to change the global political and economic power landscape, and the implications are most evident in the Middle East. Energy is closely linked to the fate of regional countries: it not only directly determines the status of the Middle East in international geopolitics but also influences the economic development of countries in the region. The discovery of oil in the 1940s turned the Middle East from an impoverished and backward region to one with globally projecting power, wealth and influence within just a few decades. With the ongoing energy transition accelerating, the importance of oil has inevitably declined, and seismic changes have occurred in the oil market. Twenty years ago, there was worry that oil production would peak and the oil risked being depleted; now, people worry about a peak in oil consumption amid a weak demand. Should the trend continue, countries heavily dependent on oil income will be the most vulnerable, while those taking the lead in the new energy race will benefit the most. According to US oil expert Daniel Yergin, China will be the biggest winner in the global energy transition. At the same time, Russia and the oil-producing countries in the Middle East will be the biggest losers, and the US will fare in between.
However, the energy transition will take time and is likely tortuous. In the immediate future, the importance of Middle East energy may not decline but even rise. In the international energy landscape, the aggregate oil production of Saudi Arabia, the US and Russia accounts for approximately one-third of the worlds total, making the three countries indisputably the major players in the global oil market. Since the outbreak of the Ukraine Crisis, Russias proportion has seen a dramatic plunge because of sanctions by the US and other Western countries, which turned the tripartite competition into a US-Saudi duel. In the past half year, Saudi Arabia has twice significantly cut its oil production together with Russia despite strong opposition from the US. The move demonstrated the Saudis’ growing influence in setting international oil prices.
Third, while the Middle East has witnessed a consistent decline in its importance in the US global strategy, China and Russia are placing more value on the region. Given the qualitative changes in major-power relations and the ongoing energy transition, major countries have been actively adjusting their global strategic priorities. In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Middle East was once the focus of US global strategy. The US launched two large-scale regional wars against Afghanistan and Iraq and identified counterterrorism as the top priority of its global strategy; The US also proposed the promotion of democracy in the Middle East allegedly to undercut the forces of Islamic radicalism and indoctrination. All this marked the peak of the regions strategic value in the US strategic circle.
Nevertheless, the two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq eventually became the greatest disasters of US global strategy since the Vietnam and forced the US Middle East strategy to retreat, restrain and contract. Since the US military withdrew from Iraq in 2011, the importance of the Middle East in the US global strategy has consistently declined, with the Obama administration proposing a pivot to Asia and the Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy. As the US became a net oil exporter for the first time in 2018, the importance of the Middle East eroded further. According to the 2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, China is currently identified as the most important long-term challenge, while Russia is viewed as the most imminent threat. The priority of the Middle East in the US global strategy is still on a constant decline.
When the Middle East steps down from the center stage of American global strategy; it rises in prominence in the global strategies of China and Russia. The economic interdependence between China and Middle East countries has become even closer in recent years. In 2010, Chinas trade with the regional countries accounted for 6.6% of its total foreign trade; this figure increased to 7.1% in 2019. The proportion of trade with China in the total foreign trade of Middle East countries also rose from 9.2% in 2010 to 13.1% in 2019. In 2010, only 3.9% of Middle East crude oil exports went to China, but the share had surged to 31.2% in 2019. In 2010, only 2.4% of the foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in Middle East countries came from China; in 2019, the percentage rose to 5%・ Over the same period, the proportion of FDI flows from China increased from 3.3% to 10.1%.
Notably, China and the Middle East have converging interests in both traditional and new energy. Regarding traditional energy, China is the worlds largest oil importer, and the Middle East is its largest source of oil imports. In the area of new energy, countries in the Middle East have witnessed a surge in demand for new energy. China is the largest producer in the world in terms of solar panel and windmill production, lithium batteries and other pertinent products. Political interactions between the two sides have become increasingly regular in this interdependent context. In December 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Saudi Arabia and attended the first China-Arab States Summit and the China-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit. In February 2023, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi went on a state visit to China before China successfully mediated the resumption of Saudi-Iran diplomatic relations in March. All these reflect the increasing importance of the Middle East in Chinas diplomatic layout.
Suffering from all-around Western sanctions after the eruption of the Ukraine Crisis, Russia urgently needs to find alternative political, economic and military partners. The Middle East has become a major focus of its strategic offensive. For Moscow, the conflict with the US-led West will be long-term, and the Middle East will play a more prominent role in its global strategy;10 In this context, Russia has developed its naval facility in Tartus and air base in Khmeimim, both in Syria, to deter the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) more effectively. It is also more actively leveraging the power of major regional countries, including Turkey; Iran and Saudi Arabia. With significant influence on Russia and Ukraine, Turkey is an important channel for the Russian economy to go global and provides Russia with its most needed industrial products. Since the Ukraine Crisis broke out, Russias relations with Iran have reached an unprecedented height, with the two jointly overcoming Western economic sanctions. Russia has been purchasing drones from Iran and is likely to buy missiles in the future; at the same time, it is considering selling advanced fighter jets to Iran. Together with Saudi Arabia, Russia is attempting to push up the oil price because of its declining capability to influence the international oil market following Western sanctions.
The Resumption of Saudi-Iran Diplomatic Relations
As two major countries in the Middle East, both Saudi Arabia and Iran have been actively adjusting their domestic and foreign policies in the face of a volatile international environment, hoping to take the initiative amid profound changes. For the decade following the ‘Arab Spring,the two countries vied for regional dominance. They were involved in nearly all regional hotspots, which consumed their national energy and undermined the external environment for economic development. Over the past three years, however, both countries have been looking for new global and regional partners to adapt to the multi-polar trend of Middle East international relations. With “Vision 2030” as its foremost national strategy, Saudi Arabia has placed economic development at an unprecedented height on its agenda and begun to adjust its diplomatic strategy to serve its economic strategy. Iran has also attached increasing importance to developing the economy and improving peoples livelihood to counter US sanctions. It is trying to develop relations with its neighbors, hoping to offset the impact of the American blockade through regional economic cooperation. Therefore, both Saudi Arabia and Iran shared a common desire to prioritise economic development, and the resumption of their diplomatic relations became a priority of their respective foreign policy adjustments.
After its oil facilities were attacked in 2019, Saudi Arabia decided to improve relations with Iran. In the post-Wbrld II era, the US and Saudi Arabia once allied based on “oil for security/’ under which Saudi Arabia supplied oil to the US according to the latters strategic imperatives in exchange for security guarantees from the US. However the foundation was no longer stable as the US gradually achieved oil self-sufficiency; In September 2019, two major oil facilities of the state-owned Saudi Arabian Oil Company, more commonly known as Saudi Aramco, were attacked by a combination of drones and cruise missiles, which resulted in the reduction of the countrys daily crude oil supplies by 5.7 million barrels, or 5% of the worlds daily supplies. While affirming the availability of US assistance, then US President Donald Trump seemed to downplay the impact of the attacks, saying, “That was an attack on Saudi Arabia, and that wasnt an attack on us.”” The statement completely deviated from the “oil for security” principle, forcing Saudi Arabia to rethink its national security strategy and enhance its security independence.
Over the past two decades, Saudi Arabia has relied on the US to balance the increase of Iranian influence in the region. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 defeated Irans main regional opponent and allowed Iranian forces to infiltrate Iraq. Under the Obama administration, the US engaged in détente with Iran and lifted the countrys sanctions, and persuaded Saudi Arabia to share power in the Middle East with Iran.12 During Trumps term of ofRce, the US withdrew its troops from Syria and Iraq, allowing Iran to grow even stronger. In Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, Iran possessed decisive and strategic influence, and the four states together formed a “Shia crescent.” During this period, Saudi Arabia stuck to its traditional security policy, strengthened its military ties with the US, and spared no effort to contain Iran, Most of the time, Saudi Arabia opposed the nuclear negotiations between the US and Iran or any US move to reconcile with Iran. The Saudi position was more steadfast than that of the US itself.
Nevertheless, with the growing ambiguity regarding the credibility of US security guarantees for its allies, as well as the expanding influence of Iran, Saudi Arabias security strategy has undergone major adjustments. On the premise of continuing to rely on US support, Saudi Arabia intended to take the initiative in improving its relations with Iran, thus fundamentally eliminating its own security threats while striving for more maneuvring space in handling its relations with the US. After its oil facilities were attacked in 2019, Saudi Arabia stayed calm and restrained and stopped short of accusing Iran outright. Instead, it engaged with Iran and even paid no heed to Irons private ship-to-ship oil transactions in the Persian Gul£ According to rumors, Saudi Arabia conveyed to Iran its intention to ease bilateral relations through the Iraqi prime minister. The presence of Qasem Soleimani, then Commander of the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, in Baghdad in January 2020 when he was assassinated in a targeted US drone strike, was to receive information from the Saudi side. Should the rumors be true, this marked the first indirect contact between Saudi Arabia and Iran since their severance of diplomatic relations in 2016. Though the rumoured contact attempt failed, the story highlighted the two sides’ interest to sit down.
After 2020, the advent of a “‘diplomatic spring” in the Middle East accelerated the restoration of Saudi-Iran diplomatic ties. In the wake of the ‘Arab Spring,” Saudi Arabia and Iran had both adopted an offensive and expansive approach in their respective foreign policies and deeply intervened in the internal conflicts of Syria, Yemen, Libya, Iraq and Lebanon. The strategic competition even extended to Sudan and Somalia. However, as international relations in the region became more diversified, the boundary between friend and foe in regional politics also became increasingly ambiguous. There is a growing consensus for countries in the region to make more friends and fewer enemies.
Starting in 2020, the policies of relevant countries have all witnessed some inward adjustment, and their confrontations in the region have shown signs of easing. The amiable atmosphere began a “wave of détente” and a ”diplomatic spring” in the Middle East. In September 2020, the UAE, Bahrain and Israel signed the Abraham Accords under US auspices, easing Arab-Israeli relations. In January 2021, the Qatari emir was invited to visit Saudi Arabia, which marked the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries since they cut off ties in 2017. In August 2022, Turkey and Israel also announced the full resumption of their diplomatic relations. Amid the reconciliatory wave dubbed a ”diplomatic spring,neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran is absent. In April 2021, the two sides held their first direct talks in Baghdad since they severed diplomatic ties, although neither side admitted the talks given the still tense atmosphere of bilateral relations at that time. In May of the same year, Saudi Arabia revealed its direct negotiations with Iran for the first time, and Iran made the same announcement shortly afterwards. The two countries held their fifth round of talks in Iraq in April 2022 and three more rounds later in Oman. However, the momentum for diplomatic rapprochement was abruptly halted after the large-scale demonstrations in Iran in October of the same year, in which the Iranian government accused Saudi Arabia of involvement.
The process of Saudi-Iran reconciliation resumed and accelerated following the China-Arab States Summit in December 2022. Easing the bilateral relations was a crucial component of Saudi Arabias overall diplomatic strategy and an important pillar of Irans “resistance economy” Unveiled in 2016, Saudi Arabias “Vision 2030” sets three major objectives for the country: “the heart of the Arab and Islamic worlds, the investment powerhouse, and the hub connecting three continentsSince then, Saudi Arabia has shifted the focus of its national strategy to economic construction and demonstrated unprecedented determination with substantial investment and preferential policies. As long-time columnist of The New York Times Thomas Friedman said, “In Mother Natures Middle East, leaders will be judged not by how much they resist one another or great powers, but by how much resilience they build for their people and nations at a time when the world will be phasing out fossil fuels, at a time when all the Arab-Muslim states have booming populations under the age of 30 and at a time of intensifying climate change.”
As economic development becomes the top priority of Saudi Arabias national strategy, politics, security, and ideology begin to take a back seat. Economic cooperation or competition has replaced or at least weakened the original ideological, sectarian and power struggles. Instead, economic construction, which requires a favorable external environment, has become a major driving force for the country to improve relations with its neighbors. Talking about the engagement with Iran in October 2021, Saudi Arabias Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan said, “The leadership has a clear policy that the priority is prosperity, building the country, Vision 2030 [reform plan], and you cant deliver those things with a region in turmoi
Though the first two attempts at negotiation suffered setbacks, Saudi Arabia and Iran were both looking for opportunities to resume their talks. In December 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinpings visit to Saudi Arabia to attend the China-Arab States and China-GCC Summits provided an ideal opportunity for the two countries to restart negotiations. According to reports by The Wall Street Journal^ the Saudi leader requested China to mediate during the China-GCC Summit. China later engaged Iran on this matter and received a positive response. Iran even sent its negotiator in nuclear talks to Beijing to discuss the details. In February 2023, China invited Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi for a state visit to China. On March 10, Saudi and Iranian representatives agreed to resume the two countries5 diplomatic relations within two months. On April 6, foreign ministers of the two sides formally announced the re-establishment of diplomatic ties in Beijing.
Why China.
The sudden breakthrough in the Saudi-Iran negotiations on diplomatic rapprochement surprises many; What is more unexpected, the breakthrough was made in Beijing. The resumption of Saudi-Iran diplomatic relations has something to do with major-power relations and the changing regional landscape resulting from the two countries’ policy adjustments. In this process, China has played a critical facilitating role. The Saudi-Iran rapprochement may mark the beginning of a new era in the Middle East and symbolize the debut of Chinas new diplomacy in the region.
First, Chinas Middle East diplomacy has become more proactive and all-around. During the Cold China saw the region as part of the “intermediate zones” of global politics and tended to understand the Middle East issues through the lens of great-power competition. Security was the primary concern of Chinas Middle East policy, which aimed to prevent hostile great powers from controlling the region and posing indirect military threats to China.17 After the Cold ended, economic development took center stage in Chinas Middle East policy, and China maintained a relatively detached attitude toward regional affairs. Marked by the December 2022 China-Arab States Summit, Chinas Middle East policy has witnessed another transformation from one centered around economics to one that integrates economic, political and security dimensions. The Chinese mediation in resuming Saudi-Iran diplomatic relations is the first salvo of Chinas new Middle East diplomacy.
Second, China seized the critical moment of the Middle East transformation. Over the past decade, China has increased its involvement in regional political affairs. In 2013, it came up with a four-point proposal to settle the Palestinian question. In 2014, it put forward a five-point peace proposal for settling the Palestine-Israel conflict following the flare-up of tensions in Gaza. In 2015, it suggested three basic principles for resolving the Libyan issue. On the Syrian issue, China successively proposed a six-point statement, a four-point proposal, five principles, and a afour steps” framework in the years after the Syrian civil war broke out. In October 2020, then State Councilor and Foreign Minister Yi suggested building a multilateral platform for dialogue in the Gulf region to manage crises through collective consultation. Relevant countries welcomed the proposals. Still, there was no opportunity to translate them into concrete actions.
The efforts from both Saudi Arabia and Iran to restore their diplomatic ties provided a timely opportunity for China to break new ground in its Middle East involvement. Different from other regional hotspot issues, the Saudi-Iran rapprochement has been actively pushed by both sides over the past three years, who had previously held eight rounds of talks in Iraq and Oman and achieved some positive outcomes. In recent months, re-establishing diplomatic relations has become an even more urgent issue for both countries. For Saudi Arabia, the Yemen issue has increasingly posed a major obstacle to its economic development. Since 2015, the Houthi forces have carried out more than 1,000 rocket or missile attacks on Saudi Arabia and flown at least 350 drones into the country; Though fatalities were rare, these attacks seriously damaged investors’ confidence in Saudi Arabias business environment and disrupted economic planning. Besides, the collapse of Iran nuclear talks and the re-emergence of tensions between Iran and the US and Israel have made a military conflict in the Gulf region more likely and unnerved Saudi Arabia. Iran faces increasingly stringent economic sanctions imposed by the US-led West on the pretext of human rights, nuclear proliferation, and military cooperation with Russia. It is eager for a breakthrough in its neighborhood diplomacy. While Saudi Arabia and Iran intend to meet each other halfway; mediation by a reliable and credible major country is still necessary for bilateral negotiations on diplomatic reconciliation. China is willing and capable of playing the mediator role welt.
Third, by keeping balanced relations with all Middle East countries, China has earned trust from Saudi Arabia and Iran, and that trust laid a solid foundation for successful mediation. Long adhering to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, China has never interfered in the internal affairs of regional countries nor labelled any country as a “‘failed state； “autocracy” or “rogue regime,” let alone imposing economic sanctions on any country. China does not take sides in regional conflicts and is the only permanent United Nations Security Council member with no military bases or troops in the Middle East. Rather, China has always treated Saudi Arabia and Iran equally; During his first visit to the Middle East in 2016, President Xi Jinping visited both countries, even though they had just severed diplomatic ties. Not long after his state visit to Saudi Arabia in December 2022, President Xi invited the Iranian president to visit China in February the next year. China is not the only major country with significant influence in the Middle East but the only one that keeps balanced relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran. It is the long-accumulated diplomatic reputation that made China the most credible mediator.
Fourth, the visible alienation of Saudi Arabia and other Arab states from the United States has created opportunities for Chinese mediation. After the Cold War ended, the US was once the sole dominating power in the Middle East, with regional countries taking sides according to their relations with the US. Saudi Arabia then stood on the US side. However, with the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq in 2011, the stationing of Russian troops in Syria in 2015, and the first summit between China and Arab states in Riyadh in 2022, the era of American hegemony in the Middle East has ended. As no global power can or is willing to dominate regional affairs single-handedly, the Middle East is now characterized by multiple poles, including the US, China, Europe, Russia, and India. The US has a comparative advantage in security, forming special partnerships with Gulf Arab states and Israel. Europes competitive edge is in social and economic fields, having close ties with geographically neighboring countries in North Africa and the Levant region, Russias advantage lies in the military area, with a foothold in Syria and cooperation with regional powers, including Iran, Turkey, Israel and Egypt, The highlight of Chinese influence is in the economic sphere, and China maintains good relations with all regional countries.
With the relative decline of American clout and the comparative ascent of other major powers5 influence, countries in the Middle East no longer take sides according to their positions toward the US; instead, they are going all out to leverage those major powers’ positions and enhance their own independent capabilities. Amid uncertain prospects of great-power relations, countries in the region are particularly unwilling to follow any major power completely but try to keep their freedom of choice as much as possible to ensure they can change course at any time.
The desire for self-determination is a new phenomenon in Middle East politics. In the past, whether during the Cold era when the US and the Soviet Union scrambled for supremacy or in the post-Cold period when the US was the sole hegemon, there was a relatively clear division of blocs among Middle East countries. As the capability of global powers to intervene, control and influence regional affairs declined, the capability of regional powers to pursue an independent path and maneuvre their way amid different forces is on the rise. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, Iran, and Israel have taken more diplomatic initiatives, and the resulting actions promoted multilateralism in the region. These regional powers have expanded their diplomatic space to an unprecedented level by maneuvring between global powers, including the US, Europe, Russia and China, Never before has the political stage of the Middle East seen such diverse actors that are on par with each other, nor has there been such a complicated landscape of bloc formation and division.
Despite being a US special partner, Saudi Arabia has twice joined Russia to significantly cut their oil production in October 2022 and April 2023, regardless of strong opposition from the US. Even though the move cannot be interpreted as confrontational to the US, it is not wrong to say at least that Saudi Arabia does not prioritize American interests. Saudi seems more willing to cooperate with Russia to address the American opposition on the oil price issue. Concerning energy export, it relies on China, its largest oil export destination. However, the US is undoubtedly still its largest security provider. The Saudi preference for more balanced ties with different major powers rather than excessive dependence on the US has created greater space for developing China-Saudi relations.
Fifth, Chinas ascending influence in the Middle East has implicitly guaranteed the implementation of the Saudi-Iran agreement on diplomatic rapprochement. Historically, conflicting parties always look forward to a major power acting as a witness, guarantor, or signatory to their settlement deal, hoping that the credibility and influence of the major power would provide a favorable environment for the agreements implementation. In the case of Saudi Arabia and Iran, China is the only major country that enjoys both sides’ trust and keeps a certain influence on both of them. China is both countries’ largest trading partner and largest oil export destination. In contrast, the US and Europe have little trade with Iran. Kim Ghattas, a Middle East expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said China “was the only possible guarantor with sufficient leverage” for Saudi Arabia and Iran. The importance that both countries attach to their relationships with China is conducive to the comprehensive implementation of their agreement. Regarding the March 2023 China-Saudi-Iran joint statement, Ali Shihabi, a Saudi commentator, said agreements with Iran were usually “not worth the paper they are written on. But because [this] is a treaty with China, its a commitment towards China as much as it is towards Saudi Arabia.
With the announcement by Saudi Arabia and Iran to re-establish bilateral diplomatic relations on April 6, the Chinese mediation in the Saudi-Iran rapprochement came to a fruitful conclusion. Historically; the relationship between the two regional powers always experienced ups and downs and was never easy; The latest restoration of diplomatic ties is a small step for bilateral relations but an important episode for Chinas Middle East diplomacy. The event marks the first time China successfully mediated a seemingly intractable problem between two Middle East powers. In 2016, then US President Obama once expressed hope that the Saudis and the Iranians would “find an effective way to share the neighborhood and institute some sort of cold peace.>28 But the remarks drew a fierce reaction from Saudi Arabia. At that time, it was unimaginable for Obama that the two archrivals would achieve “hot peace” several years later. According to the state-run Saudi Press Agency; during their April 2023 meeting that formally restored diplomatic ties, Saudi Arabia and Iran aimed to “enhance the security, stability, and prosperity of the two countries and peoples.”9 Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of Irons Supreme National Security Council, said, “Clearing misunderstandings and looking towards the future in Tehran-Riyadh relations will definitely lead to the development of regional stability and security.
Trend and Implications of Middle East Diplomatic Reconciliation
Starting in 2020, the current wave of reconciliation in the Middle East has gained additional momentum and got more countries involved after the release of the China-Saudi-Iran joint statement in March 2023. The Saudi-Iran rivalry was a mainstay in Middle East politics, with profound repercussions across the region. In the wake of the ‘Arab Spring； the rivalry intensified, and the negative spillover rapidly broadened, leading to deteriorating civil wars in Yemen and Syria and domestic upheaval in Lebanon. Following the Saudi-Iran diplomatic reconciliation this time, positive developments have emerged quickly around the region and spread extensively; In just over a month, substantial breakthroughs were witnessed between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi forces in Yemen in their negotiations for a permanent ceasefire. Foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia and Syria exchanged visits for the first time in ten years. The Turkish foreign minister also met his Egyptian counterpart after a decade. Iran and Bahrain prepared to resume their diplomatic relations. The Iranian and Jordanian foreign ministers had a phone call. And the Hamas group was invited to visit Saudi Arabia. On April 12, Tunisia and Syria, Bahrain and Qatar respectively announced the resumption of their diplomatic ties. In the future, the positive spillover effect of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement is expected to grow further. Israel is also likely to take some conciliatory action toward Iran unless it intends to be excluded from this wave of reconciliation, as an Israeli expert revealed that “most of the countries in the region view dialogue as the best way to deal with Iran, leaving Israel as the sole country that is focused on a military option.
For the long-suffering, war-torn and turbulent Middle East, the current wave of détente is a rare positive signal, and its beneficial effect is expected to continue for some time. However, for how long the reconciliatory momentum will be sustained and whether it will effectively resolve the current conflicts and problems remain unknown, and the advent of a new Middle East is far from certain.
Among the major regional hotspots in the Middle East, the one between the Islamic states and Israel has generally eased. The Arab states and Turkey in the Islamic camp have improved their relations with Israel, but the relationship between Iran and Israel is deteriorating. On the feud between the supporters and opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood, relations between the countries concerned have all experienced some improvement due to the declining influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Middle East politics. But with the recent worsening economic situation in non-oil-exporting countries, the re-emergence of domestic political upheavals is still a possibility that cannot be ruled out. For the conflict between Sunnis and Shiites, despite the latest Saudi-Iran rapprochement, Saudi Arabia has not given up its request for Western countries to impose greater pressure on Iran. For Iran, which intends to alleviate the impact of Western sanctions by easing relations with Saudi Arabia, the beneficial effects of rebuilding diplomatic ties remain to be seen. Of the rivalry between the pro-US bloc and the anti-US bloc, the relationship between the US and Iran is growing more antagonistic, even when Saudi Arabia and Iran are easing their tension.
The resumption of Saudi-Iran diplomatic relations does not end the power competition between the two countries. It simply plays out in another way; Iran is consolidating its cooperation with Hamas, Hezbollah, and the militias in Iraq and Syria to build a more effective coalition of Shiites. Saudi Arabia has demonstrated even more ambitions, with one Saudi official claiming that “the kingdom is evolving from a regional powerhouse to a global player.>32 With tremendous sovereign wealth funds, Saudi Arabia is gradually expanding its influence among Sunni countries. As The Economist pointed out, when sovereign wealth funds became fashionable two decades ago, the fears of many in the West that they might be used to pursue political agendas were overblown; they now seem more reasonable, but few are paying attention.
There are several perennial unstable factors in the region that cast a shadow upon the political prospects of the Middle East. In particular, the Iran nuclear issue deserves special attention. The hostility between the US and Iran is rising despite easing Saudi-Iran relations. The US has steadily increased its sanctions against Iran, and negotiations on a renewed Iran nuclear deal were protracted without an agreement. A conflict between Iran on one side and the US and Israel on the other over the nuclear issue has grown more likely; directly impacting Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia. Iran has repeatedly implied that it would attack Saudi Arabia or the UAE in retaliation in the event of an attack on its nuclear facilities by the US or Israel from Saudi or UAE territories.
For major global powers, the Saudi-Iran rapprochement marks the advent of a multi-polar era of Middle East international relations, which is positive and encouraging but whose future trajectory and implications remain uncertain. On the one hand, the US no longer has as much influence in the Middle East as it once enjoyed, while the influence of Europe, China, Russia and India is rising. Countries in the region have also become more independent in pursuing their development paths. Middle East politics5 multipolarity trend is generally positive for the world.
On the other hand, even though it has been the mainstream opinion of most developing countries that a multi-polar world is the foundation for a stable international order in the 21st century; the US has always been vigilant to the global trend of multi-polarity; In recent years, its military deployment in the Middle East has increased instead of decreasing. Even though it has welcomed the current wave of diplomatic reconciliation, it is highly uneasy about and even fearful of Chinas expanding clout because of its successful mediation and Irons benefits from the rapprochement. Immediately after the release of the China-Saudi-Iran joint statement in Beijing, the US publicly expressed concern about the growing Chinese influence in the Middle East and the danger that the Iranian government could use restored ties with Saudi Arabia to bypass intensifying American sanctions and isolation. Regardless of American perceptions, the rise of Chinas influence in the region will be a long-term trend, as the country plans to promote a dialogue platform for Gulf security; According to Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, a professor of politics in the UAE. «There’s a trust deficit with America, which is growing by the day. The trend is more of China, less of America on all fronts, not just economically but politically, militarily and strategically in the years to come.” Given this, a fiercer competition is foreseeable between the two major powers in the Middle East.
For Middle East countries, the increasing independent stand of regional powers and the continuous easing of their relations are generally conducive to regional peace and stability; Still, there remain uncertainties in the prospects of the reconciliatory trend. The regional situation is likely to enter a new period of relative peace, albeit with more complexity and volatility; On the one hand, Saudi Arabia pursues a foreign policy of “zero problems” and is working to improve relations with multiple forces ranging from Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Qatar to Yemens Houthi militias, Palestines Hamas group, and Hezbollah in Lebanon.9 It even intends to expand its engagement with Israel.
On the other hand, the kingdoms diplomacy is also dubbed as a kind of “extreme balancing” or “extreme hedging” attempting to keep a delicate balance between China and the US. It invited China to mediate its reconciliation with Iran while announcing a deal with Boeing worth around $37 billion in jets and agreeing to join the US-dominated 5G and 6G networks. It even tries to play the balancing game between Iran and Israel: the resumption of Saudi-Iran diplomatic ties happened just as the kingdom reportedly set out its conditions for normalizing relations with Israel. The same approach is also used on the Palestinian issue, where Saudi Arabia wants to balance Hamas and Fatah by inviting leaders of both sides for visits. For Iran, there is also the consideration of balancing Saudi Arabia against the US and Israel in its decision to ease relations with Saudi Arabia. The prevalent engaging and balancing acts among regional powers and the “‘extreme balancing” policy some adopt will complicate the Middle Easts multi-polarisation process.
Conclusion
Chinas successful mediation in the diplomatic rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran and the accompanying wave of détente across the Middle East have positive implications for regional peace and can inspire world peace. The Chinese move wins extensive recognition from Western academic and policy-making communities. In the opinion of former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, it is “a substantial change in the strategic situation in the Middle East” and “changes the terms of reference in international diplomacy.’ China emerged as a peacemaker while the US is no longer the indispensable power in the region. As explained by Kissinger, China, which has declared that it must participate in creating the world order in recent years, has made a significant move in that direction. A report by the European Council on Foreign Relations also pointed out that the China-Saudi-Iran joint statement demonstrated Beijing s willingness to assume more responsibilities for international peace, saying, “This upholds the prospect of some international cooperation behind shared interests in the face of a broader retreat into zerosum global competition.
For the war-torn and conflict-ridden Middle East, the resumption of Saudi-Iran diplomatic relations under Chinese mediation heralds a new era of joint development. The Middle East has long been a synonym for war and instability in international politics. During the Cold the region experienced four wars between Arabs and Israelis. After the end of the Cold War the US successively launched or was involved in the Gulf War the Afghanistan War,and the Iraq Over the past decade, countries including Libya, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and Sudan have been embroiled in civil war. The current wave of reconciliation is extremely valuable and deserves to be cherished by relevant countries.
The Saudi-Iran rapprochement represents a new ethos of mutual respect and equality in international politics, which has long been based on the law of the jungle and Western ideology. Historically, great powers have participated in Middle East affairs based on alliances and divisions, often through military intervention. The power intervention legacy ended dismally and left endless troubles in the region. The Middle East strategies of the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States have all witnessed similar ebbs and flows. Foreign intervention was a major cause of the tragedies in the region. As the current wave of reconciliation shows, consultation based on equality is becoming a new basic norm for exchanges between Middle East countries, and Chinas mediation efforts in the restoration of Saudi-Iran ties served as an important attempt for the new norm.
Admittedly, the resumption of diplomatic relations will unlikely resolve all the longstanding touchy issues between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The economic reforms of Arab states will not be a guaranteed smooth voyage either. The wave of detente in the Middle East may even experience setbacks. However, the US strategic retreat in the region, the priority that Arab states have repeatedly placed on economic development, and the growing awareness of self-determination among their people are all positive signals that herald larger, deeper and more substantial changes in the Middle East, which is expected to become the most important historical transformation since the formation of nation-states in the region in the early 20th century. The new changes in the Middle East will provide more opportunities for developing relations between China and regional countries and broaden the horizons of Chinas Middle East diplomacy.