The Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Impact of the Ukraine Crisis on the Belt and Road Initiative
The outbreak of the current major international crisis is a chain reaction caused by the adjustment of America’s global strategy. The core of America’s global strategic adjustment is to contain China. The eastward expansion of NATO and the overall weakening of Russia are only part of this global strategic adjustment. The Ukraine crisis is the most significant sudden geopolitical change since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The Belt and Road Initiative is the biggest geoeconomic transition since economic globalization in the 1990s. Sudden changes and gradual changes are intertwined, leading to the frequent occurrence of “black swan矿 and “gray rhinoceroses” that the international strategic community failed to predict. At the same time, Russia is the only place to host the Belt and Road corridor connecting China and Europe. Its stability has a profound bearing on the construction of industrial chains and supply chains driven by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
I The outbreak of the Ukraine crisis has had an unprecedented geopolitical and geoeconomic impact on the BRI. First, there is the danger of a small local conflict turning into a large local war or even a nuclear war. If there is a large-scale local war in Russia, the Belt and Road corridor will fall under the shadow of war. Second, the Ukraine crisis accelerated the process of the globalization of NATO and the NATO-ization of Asia. NATO countries, working closely with America’s Asian allies, have put enormous pressure on the Belt and Road from both the East and West. Third, the previously interdependent energy supply and demand relationship between Europe and Russia has been cut off forcibly by the United States and NATO, resulting in a significant change in the global energy pattern. Fourth, Russia’s economic center of gravity has shifted eastward and its economic structure has changed. Under the influence of the Ukrainian crisis, Russia moved its economic center eastward and paid attention to the development of the Russian Far East, which led to the Belt and Road cooperation shifting from focusing on “westward advancement” to moving in three directions: westward advancement, eastward advancement, and southward advancement, among which the importance of revitalizing Northeast China and developing the Russian Far East is particularly prominent. Fifth, the centrifugal tendency of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization is getting stronger. After the start of the Ukraine Crisis, Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan and Caucasus countries are openly at odds with Russia, and even openly opposed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is difficult to determine the development direction of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Sixth, the foundation of the world monetary and financial system with the US dollar at its core has been shaken, and the weaponization of the US dollar and extreme sanctions against Russia have damaged the credibility of the US dollar. At the same time, dollar inflation and a high interest rate policy hurt the euro, which will continue to affect the relationship between the EU and the United States and NATO. Seventh, the Ukrainian crisis triggered a new round of the global arms race, including new high-tech weapons such as unmanned combat aircraft, artificial intelligence weapons, tactical nuclear weapons, long-range guided weapons, and cyber strikes, as well as the quantitative confrontation of traditional weapons such as surface ships, main battle tanks, long-range artillery, and helicopters. Eighth, the biological laboratory of the US military in Ukraine evidenced that biological warfare has started. To sum up, the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on geopolitics and the geoeconomy goes far beyond the locus of Ukraine and Russia and will have a wide, deep, and lasting impact on global geopolitics, especially on Belt and Road cooperation.
II Repositioning the north, middle, and south trunk lines of the Belt and Road. The Eurasian corridor of the Belt and Road is the core connection of Eurasian economic integration. Following the Ukrainian crisis, it can be divided into three trunk lines: north, middle, and south according to the degree of threat to its stability. First, the north line of the Grand Passage (the main line of China-Europe trains) is in danger of being blocked. The north line (Siberia-Moscow-Baltic Sea-Poland; Kazakhstan-Baltic Sea-Poland) is the main line of the big channel, including about 90% of the freight between China and Europe. If Russia is sanctioned, the battlefield situation in Ukraine will continue to deteriorate, and the north line will face the risk of interruption. The prospects of Eurasian land transportation and China-Europe trains are not optimistic. Second, the substitution effect of the middle line of the Belt and Road is limited. The middle line (Caspian Sea-Caucasus-Black Sea) needs to be transshipped through the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea, and the transportation speed is limited. At the same time, many connection points in the middle line have not been completely closed. Even if the middle line is completely opened, it can only bear about 10% of the capacity of the north line, with poor substitutability. Third, the south line of the Belt and Road has great potential, but there are many connecting obstacles. The south line includes Kashgar (China)-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey-Black Sea-Balkan Peninsula. However, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway is still in the planning, and it is unlikely to be constructed within five years. The Kurdish region through which the south line must pass is the focus of contention between Iran and Turkey, and the south line in this area cannot be connected successfully. After entering Europe through Turkey, the south line still faces difficulties such as getting through the connecting points on the road and crossing the sea. In addition, the south line cannot replace the transportation volume of the north line completely. If the south line is opened, it will change the geopolitical and geoeconomic structure of Eurasia profoundly. In the next few years, the three lines may not connect smoothly, and it will take at least five years to be fully connected.
Ill Sections of the Belt and Road need to be re-divided and combined. Due to the huge geopolitical and geoeconomic impact of the Ukraine crisis on the Eurasian corridor, some of the original connectivity points of the Belt and Road have been interrupted, while new ones have been created, and the regions along the Belt and Road will be restructured. First, Southeast Asia5s position highlights its close integration with the Chinese market. Southeast Asia is the most important region of the Belt and Road Initiative. Southeast Asia’s GDP, trade, investment, and regulation alignment with China have improved in all aspects. Second, Central Asia is being disconnected from Russia. Central Asian energy is being diverted to Europe, and Europe can replace Russian energy with Central Asian energy. Third, Russia’s Far East region combines with Northeast Asia. The integration of Russia5s Far East with Northeast China, Mongolia, the Republic of Korea, and Japan has accelerated, and land-sea transport has been developed. Russia’s natural gas, oil, and gas pipeline center of gravity will shift to China. China’s land lease in Russia is expected to expand more than tenfold, enough to transform the world5s food supply chain. Fourth, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor connects Central and West Asia. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor will move westward to connect with the south line and accelerate its integration with Central and West Asia. Fifth, the section of Central and Eastern Europe disintegrated and the section of Eastern Mediterranean formed. For the time being, the existing cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries (“17 + 1” cooperation) cannot continue to operate for the time being. At the same time, the Eastern Mediterranean region including Hungary, Serbia, Greece, and Turkey began to unite into a new section. Sixth, the EU will be divided into four subregions: east, south, west, and north, each with its own strategic interests to pursue. Seventh, the strategic power game between China and the United States has begun to spread to Latin America, Africa, and the South Pacific. As the global infrastructure investment plans of the United States and Europe cannot reach their capacity, the “three south regions55 (South America, sub Saharan Africa, and South Pacific) and the Belt and Road need to connect more urgently.
IV The United States’ global strategic choices in response to the Ukraine crisis and the BRI. First, the United States seeks to drag Russia down and isolate China with a strategy of prolonging the Ukraine crisis. Peace is unlikely in the short term, but the risk of a nuclear war is low. Thus, the United States will use the crisis to drag Russia down and isolate China, which is cooperating with Russia. Second, the global power deployment centered on the US IndoPacific strategy remains unchanged and continues to strengthen. The United States will continue to strengthen its military deployment in the Indo-Pacific region and enhance its control over the region. At the same time, it penetrates the geoeconomic structure of East Asia and South Asia with the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Third, the United States will draw on the experience of the “Ukraine model； list Taiwan as a “non-NATO ally,” and prepare for a showdown with China across the Taiwan Strait by arming Taiwan massive in advance (including advanced weapons reserves, training of military personnel, and joint military exercises), to prevent Taiwan from experiencing a situation similar to that of Ukraine in the early stage of the conflict. Fourth, the United States targets the high-tech sector and the BRI, attacking China from a strategic height and breadth. The United States competes with China for the strategic heights of science and technology by blocking and cutting off products related to high-tech supply. In terms of the breadth of its strategic space, the United States uses the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment to disrupt China’s Belt and Road global connectivity. Fifth, the United States constructs and launches a digital war against China through a public opinion war, a cognitive war, and an intelligence war. By taking advantage of its strengths in public opinion, cognition, and intelligence, the United States is attempting to build a “digital encirclement” against China and penetrate China5s domestic public opinion arena deeply. Sixth, the key to China-US strategic competition lies in two “middle zones55: allies and countries along the Belt and Road. The United States is competing with China for countries along the Belt and Road by bringing allies such as Europe and Japan into the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment.
V China’s strategic choice under the new situation. Facing the for-reaching impact of the Ukraine crisis on China’s BRI, China must be fully prepared. First, in the face of the complex situation of the Ukraine crisis and the United States’ blocking of the BRI, we should make all preparations, and especially prepare for a long-term response. Second, in the strategic power game with the United States, we should avoid going with the flow and seize the initiative. We should adopt the strategic principle of “you fight in your way, I fight in my way, and fight if we win, run if we cannot win ” We should use our strengths to fight against others5 weaknesses. Third, in the process of high-quality development of the Belt and Road cooperation, we should focus our strengths on achieving breakthroughs in key areas and prevent the Belt and Road from being overstretched. Fourth, we should avoid making enemies on all sides. Even if we fight against them, we should adopt the principle of waging struggles on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint” We need to postpone and avoid but prepare for a strategic showdown. Fifth, given the dual nature of the “paper tiger” and the “real tiger” in the United States, we should attack its key point and avoid fighting with it when it is full of vigor. The United States is temporarily short of funds and resources to compete with China in a comprehensive industrial chain with infrastructure connectivity as the core, but it can attack China5s Belt and Road project with soft power. We should be prepared for a protracted war and make use of the BRI to drag our rivals down. Sixth, we need to shape and seize global strategic opportunities and turn crises into opportunities. The United States is facing deepening and intertwined crises in security, the economy (financial and monetary, manufacturing, fiscal debt), technology, society, and domestic politics. China should use its strategic resolve and strategic resilience to seize the opportunity to fight and turn the crisis into a chance to turn things around.
All in all, to advance high-quality Belt and Road cooperation comprehensively in a new era, time, justice, confidence, and victory are on our side.